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Abstract 
The first essay considers how the timing of government education spending influences 
the intergenerational persistence of income. We build a life-cycle model where human capital is 
accumulated in early and late childhood. Both families and the government can increase the 
human capital of young agents by investing in education at each stage of childhood. Ability in 
each dynasty follows a stochastic process. Different abilities and resultant spending histories 
generate a stochastic steady state distribution of income. We calibrate our model to match 
aggregate statistics in terms of education expenditures, income persistence and inequality. We 
show that increasing government spending in early childhood education is effective in lowering 
intergenerational earnings elasticity. An increase in government funding of early childhood 
education equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP reduces income persistence by 8.4 percent. We find 
that this relatively large effect is due to the weakening relationship between family income and 
education investment. Since this link is already weak in late childhood, allocating more public 
resources to late childhood education does not improve the intergenerational mobility of 
economic status. Furthermore, focusing more on late childhood may raise intergenerational 
persistence by amplifying the gap in human capital developed in early childhood. 
The second essay considers parental time investment in early childhood as an education 
input and explores the impact of early education policies on labor supply and human capital. I 
develop a five-period overlapping generations model where human capital formation is a multi-
stage process. An agent's human capital is accumulated through early and late childhood. Parents 
make income and time allocation decisions in response to government expenditures and parental 
leave policies. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy so that the generated data matches 
the Gini index and parental participation in education expenditures. The general equilibrium 
environment shows that subsidizing private education spending and adopting paid parental leave 
are both effective at increasing human capital. These two policies give parents incentives to 
increase physical and time investment, respectively. Labor supply decreases due to the 
introduction of paid parental leave as intended. In addition, low-wage earners are most 
responsive to parental leave by working less and spending more time with children. 
The third essay is on the motherhood wage penalty. There is substantial evidence that 
women with children bear a wage penalty of 5 to 10 percent due to their motherhood status. This 
  
wage gap is usually estimated by comparing the wages of working mothers to childless women 
after controlling for human capital and individual characteristics. This method runs into the 
problem of selection bias by excluding non-working women. This paper addresses the issue in 
two ways. First, I develop a simple model of fertility and labor participation decisions to 
examine the relationships among fertility, employment, and wages. The model implies that 
mothers face different reservation wages due to variance in preference over child care, while 
non-mothers face the same reservation wage. Thus, a mother with a relatively high wage may 
choose not to work because of her strong preference for time with children. In contrast, a 
childless woman who is not working must face a relatively low wage. For this reason, empirical 
analysis that focuses only on employed women may result in a biased estimate of the 
motherhood wage penalty. Second, to test the predictions of the model, I use 2004-2009 data 
from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) and include non-working 
women in the two-stage Heckman selection model. The empirical results from OLS and the fixed 
effects model are consistent with the findings in previous studies. However, the child penalty 
becomes smaller and insignificant after non-working women are included. It implies that the 
observed wage gap in the labor market appears to overstate the child wage penalty due to the 
sample selection bias.  
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Abstract 
The first essay considers how the timing of government education spending influences 
the intergenerational persistence of income. We build a life-cycle model where human capital is 
accumulated in early and late childhood. Both families and the government can increase the 
human capital of young agents by investing in education at each stage of childhood. Ability in 
each dynasty follows a stochastic process. Different abilities and resultant spending histories 
generate a stochastic steady state distribution of income. We calibrate our model to match 
aggregate statistics in terms of education expenditures, income persistence and inequality. We 
show that increasing government spending in early childhood education is effective in lowering 
intergenerational earnings elasticity. An increase in government funding of early childhood 
education equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP reduces income persistence by 8.4 percent. We find 
that this relatively large effect is due to the weakening relationship between family income and 
education investment. Since this link is already weak in late childhood, allocating more public 
resources to late childhood education does not improve the intergenerational mobility of 
economic status. Furthermore, focusing more on late childhood may raise intergenerational 
persistence by amplifying the gap in human capital developed in early childhood. 
The second essay considers parental time investment in early childhood as an education 
input and explores the impact of early education policies on labor supply and human capital. I 
develop a five-period overlapping generations model where human capital formation is a multi-
stage process. An agent's human capital is accumulated through early and late childhood. Parents 
make income and time allocation decisions in response to government expenditures and parental 
leave policies. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy so that the generated data matches 
the Gini index and parental participation in education expenditures. The general equilibrium 
environment shows that subsidizing private education spending and adopting paid parental leave 
are both effective at increasing human capital. These two policies give parents incentives to 
increase physical and time investment, respectively. Labor supply decreases due to the 
introduction of paid parental leave as intended. In addition, low-wage earners are most 
responsive to parental leave by working less and spending more time with children. 
The third essay is on the motherhood wage penalty. There is substantial evidence that 
women with children bear a wage penalty of 5 to 10 percent due to their motherhood status. This 
  
wage gap is usually estimated by comparing the wages of working mothers to childless women 
after controlling for human capital and individual characteristics. This method runs into the 
problem of selection bias by excluding non-working women. This paper addresses the issue in 
two ways. First, I develop a simple model of fertility and labor participation decisions to 
examine the relationships among fertility, employment, and wages. The model implies that 
mothers face different reservation wages due to variance in preference for child care, while non-
mothers face the same reservation wage. Thus, a mother with a relatively high wage may choose 
not to work because of her strong preference over time with children. In contrast, a childless 
woman who is not working must face a relatively low wage. For this reason, empirical analysis 
that focuses only on employed women may result in a biased estimate of the motherhood wage 
penalty. Second, to test the predictions of the model, I use 2004-2009 data from the 1997 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) and include non-working women in the two-
stage Heckman selection model. The empirical results from OLS and the fixed effects model are 
consistent with the findings in previous studies. However, the child penalty becomes smaller and 
insignificant after non-working women are included. It implies that the observed wage gap in the 
labor market appears to overstate the child wage penalty due to the sample selection bias
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Chapter 1 - Early childhood education expenditures and the 
intergenerational persistence of income 
 1 Introduction 
Children from lower income families tend to earn less in adulthood than children from 
wealthier families. This intergenerational persistence of income reflects more than inherited 
traits. Children from wealthier families are provided with more and better education, a 
socioeconomic environment more suitable for human capital accumulation, and greater 
workplace opportunities through networking. As a result, children of equal ability at birth can 
enter the job market with vastly different prospects. 
Government education spending can mitigate this to some degree by weakening the link 
between parental income and the educational opportunities of their offspring. In the United 
States, government plays the predominant role in education funding beginning with primary 
school. Through primary and secondary school, government provides more than 90 percent of 
all expenditures. Learning opportunities, however, arise much earlier. A wealth of evidence 
shows that a child's learning environment prior to primary education can have a substantial 
effect on academic achievement and beyond. Government support of education through these 
years is substantial but much lower. Government provides less than 40 percent of the 
expenditures for early childhood education. 
This paper considers the extent to which increased public funding of early childhood 
education could reduce the intergenerational persistence of income. We distinguish funding in 
early childhood from late childhood spending because of the different government spending 
patterns across these levels and the singular role of early childhood in the development of skills. 
We develop a model where the relatively low level of government funding in early childhood 
causes a relatively high disparity in resources devoted to children's education at this level. As a 
result, differences in ability and skills are developed before primary education begins. The 
ability gap means a disparity in the preparedness of students to acquire human capital through 
additional education. With differences in learning ability, even relatively egalitarian primary 
and secondary education further widens the achievement gap between children from poor and 
wealthy families. This achievement gap becomes a wage gap as students become workers. 
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The magnification of ability differences in the pre-primary years is made more severe by 
the critical role of early childhood education in skill accumulation. Compelling evidence 
demonstrates that skills attained early in life form the foundation of later achievement. Cunha et 
al. (2005) show that disparities in ability across young children account for much of the 
variation in socioeconomic outcomes as adults. Knudsen et al. (2006) cite evidence from 
economics, neurobiology and sociology to show that different abilities and skills are formed in 
different stages of the life cycle and that some essential skills are developed in early childhood. 
They emphasize that one cannot easily substitute later education for earlier education. Heckman 
(2006) summarizes two key roles of early learning that account for this lack of substitutability. 
First, it causes children to value acquired skills which motivates additional learning. Second, 
mastering cognitive, social and emotional skills early in life makes later learning more 
efficient.1
Based on this evidence, we follow Cunha et al. (2007) and model human capital 
accumulation as a multi-stage process where the timing of education investment is critical to its 
effectiveness. Education at one stage enhances productivity in the next and later investment 
increases the value of earlier investment. We model early childhood education as being both 
relatively productive and a strong complement to late childhood education. This raises the 
stakes for any missed opportunity to invest in early childhood. 
  
We show that increments to public funding of education in early childhood have much 
larger effects on persistence than increments to funding in late childhood. We then explore 
which features of early childhood education explain this. Part of the difference in policy 
effectiveness stems from the pivotal role of early childhood education. When we allow early 
childhood education to play the same role as education at other levels, increasing early spending 
causes a smaller change in persistence. However, it is still more effective than increasing late 
spending. The remaining difference in policy effectiveness is explained by differences in how 
education at the different levels is funded. 
In our model, both families and government can provide funding at each stage of 
education. The key to decreasing income persistence is to weaken the link between total 
spending on education and family income. The key to weakening this link through increased 
government funding of education is the responsiveness of family spending to government 
                                                 
1 Related work includes Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Currie (2001). 
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spending. In our model, families value the human capital of their children but also value 
consumption. In the case where private and public spending are substitutable, increased 
government spending on education results in decreased family spending. When family spending 
is low, however, there is scarce room for such crowding out. Since low income families spend 
relatively little on education, a modest amount of government spending can drive family 
spending near zero. At the same level of government spending, a wealthy family may devote 
considerable private resources to education. An increment to government spending then lowers 
private spending more for the wealthy than for the poor. Equivalently, increments to 
government expenditures increase total spending more for low income families than for high 
income families. As a result, income and education spending are less closely linked and 
persistence of income diminishes. 
At the primary and secondary levels, the link between income and spending is weak at 
current levels of government spending. Since government provides most of the resources, 
family spending is near zero for most families. In essence, the potential to decrease persistence 
through this channel has been nearly fully exploited. Since families provide more spending in 
early childhood, there is more scope for increased government funding to decrease the spending 
gap. In turn there is more scope to decrease income persistence. 
Since public spending mostly crowds out private spending at the upper end of the 
income distribution, spending at the lower end of the distribution is more effective in reducing 
persistence. We show that considerable decreases in persistence arise from allocating early 
childhood spending progressively. This is helpful in understanding the success of such 
programs as the Perry Preschool Project, the Abecedarian Project (see Cunha et al. (2007)), and 
Head Start (see Currie (2001)). These are programs targeted directly at the early development of 
children from low income families and each has arguably been highly effective. 
Our work is related to recent papers by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2010). 
Resutuccia and Urrutia also consider the role of education at different stages on the 
intergenerational persistence of earnings. However, they focus on a two-stage education process 
modeled after early and college education where early education encompasses all of education 
prior to college. Features that distinguish these two levels of education are quite different than 
those that distinguish early and late childhood education. Thus they consider related but distinct 
questions. They find that increasing funding of pre-college education is more effective than 
funding for college. In this sense our work can be seen as a refinement of this prescription. We 
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argue that when increasing pre-college funding, it is best to focus these additional resources on 
the pre-primary period. 
Holter (2010) builds a model in a similar vein in order to understand better the sources 
of differing levels of intergenerational income persistence in Western economies. He also 
considers how persistence in the U.S. would change upon implementing Danish policies. He 
finds that the required increased progressivity of taxes would have a larger effect on persistence 
than the required spending changes. Holter models education as a multistage process. While 
there are several periods prior to college, education is assumed to begin at age 5 and the pre-
college periods contribute to human capital in a symmetric fashion. Also, there are not sharp 
funding differences across the pre-college periods. Thus the paper also addresses a distinct set 
of questions. 
Our work is also related to Abington and Blankenau (2011) and the model in that paper 
is the starting point for this work. Abington and Blankenau consider circumstances under which 
the current government funding structure, i.e. focusing on later childhood, can be appropriate 
despite the importance of early childhood education. In that model, however, agents perfectly 
inherit the ability of their parents. In a steady state, prodigy income is the same as parental 
income so persistence is one. Thus substantial modifications to the model are required to 
facilitate an investigation of income persistence. 
 2 The model 
We consider an overlapping generations model where agents live for fifteen periods and 
each period lasts five years. The first period is spent in early childhood, the next three in late 
childhood, the fifth as a worker and the parent of a child in early childhood, the next three as a 
worker and the parent of a child in late childhood, and the remainder in work and retirement as 
empty nesters. There are 4N distinct dynasties where N is large. Each dynasty has a child every 
four periods. The dynasties are staggered so that a child is born into one fourth of the dynasties 
in each period. At the beginning of any period t, then, N agents comprising generation t are born 
into early childhood as the prodigy of the current young parents. In the subsequent period, as 
their parents move to late parenthood, the offspring move to late childhood. Generation t 
reaches parenthood in period t+4 with offspring in early childhood. As they transition to late 
parenthood in period t+5, their children transition to late childhood. At the end of period t+8, 
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they are empty nesters and continue working until period t+12. In periods t+13 and t+14 they 
are retired and subsequently exit the economy. 
 2.1 Production of human capital 
We focus on four distinct life stages: early and late childhood and early and late 
parenthood. Early childhood and early parenthood each last one period whereas late childhood 
and late parenthood each last three periods. While the fifteen-period structure is convenient for 
our calibration, distinctions across these life stages are key to our results. 
As agents enter parenthood, they are heterogeneous in human capital. The root cause of 
this heterogeneity is exogenous ability shocks in each dynasty. Let 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 be the ability parameter 
of the child born to dynasty i in period t and 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−4 be the ability parameter of this child's parent 
who was born to dynasty i in period t-4. For each dynasty, the sequence of abilities across 
generations follows a first order autoregressive process in logarithms. More succinctly 
𝑙𝑛�𝑎𝑖,𝑡� = 𝑎� + 𝜌 𝑙𝑛�𝑎𝑖,𝑡−4� + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑎2). 
Here 𝑎� is a constant and 𝜌 is the intergenerational correlation of innate abilities. Accordingly, 
the mean of ln�𝑎𝑖,𝑡� is 𝑎 �1−𝜌 . The parameter 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a random shock term with a normal 
distribution of mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝑎2. Ability differences partly explain income differences in 
most empirical and theoretical work. Thus it is natural to consider persistence in ability in 
investigations of income persistence. Persistence of this sort is a feature in both Restuccia and 
Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2010). 
There is a high notational cost for precision in our model. We opt to limit this where 
possible and adopt a shorthand2
𝑙𝑛(𝑎�) = 𝑎 + 𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝜀, 𝜀~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑎2). 
. We drop the i notation fully, with the understanding that the 
productivity measure, a, and many endogenous items pertain to a dynasty and should have 
subscript i. We also eliminate time subscripts. Instead, items with no qualifiers refer to adults 
and the notation refers to their children. This allows the restatement 
(1.1) 
An agent's human capital accumulates according to 
ℎ� = 𝑎�𝑒𝜇ℎ𝜐. (1.2) 
 
                                                 
2 The model with complete notations is presented in Appendix 1. 
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Here e is a measure of education expenditures on the agent's behalf, h is parental human capital 
and the parameters 𝜇, 𝜈 ∈ [0,1] are elasticities of human capital accumulation with respect to 
these inputs. Human capital has a genetic component through a, a socioeconomic component 
through h, and a means to modify these preordained inputs through education expenditures 
through e. In our model the three components are reinforcing in that the more able tend to have 
higher parental human capital and receive more education expenditures in equilibrium. 
Government spending can moderate this. 
Variants of equation (1.2) pervade the literature on human capital accumulation. For 
example, Becker and Tomes (1986) propose that human capital is formed by education 
expenditures and natural endowments, which are genetically inherited from parents.3
𝑒 = (𝛾𝑖𝑒𝛷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑖𝑙𝛷) 
 It is our 
specification of e that puts us in a more narrow literature where the multi-stage nature of human 
capital accumulation plays a key economic role. We define 
(1.3) 
where 𝑖𝑒 and 𝑖𝑙 are investment in education in early and late childhood.4
Human capital accumulation is a hierarchical process when early and late spending 
aggregates are not perfect substitutes; both the sum of these aggregates and their timing are 
important to the outcome. The parameter Φ ≤1 governs the substitutability of investment in 
early and later childhood. We have imperfect substitutability so long as Φ <1 and 
substitutability decreases with Φ. When Φ approaches 0, equation (1.3) converges to Cobb-
Douglas form 𝑒 = 𝑖𝑒𝛾𝑖𝑙{1−𝛾) with unit elasticity of substitution. Our specification is similar to that 
in Abington and Blankenau (2011), Caucutt and Lochner (2011) and Cunha and Heckman 
(2008). 
 These inputs to early 
and late childhood form e in a constant elasticity of substitution (c.e.s.) production function with 
constant return to scale. The parameter 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] gauges their relative importance. 
Investment in late childhood itself is a function of investment in the three periods of late 
childhood and given by 
𝑖𝑙 = (𝑖2𝑖3𝑖4)13. (1.4) 
                                                 
3 See also Becker and Tomes (1979), Su (2004), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2011). 
4 Examples of similar human capital production functions include Cunha et al. (2005), Abington and Blankenau 
(2011), and Caucutt and Lochner (2011). 
7 
 
Here 𝑖2, 𝑖3, and 𝑖4 are investment in the second through fourth periods. 
Both government and parents may invest in the education of children. As in Abington 
and Blankenau (2011), we specify 
𝑖𝑒 = �𝛼𝑓𝑒𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑒𝜂�1𝜂 ,    𝑖𝑘 = �𝛼𝑓𝑘𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑘𝜂�1𝜂 ,𝑘 ∈ (2,3,4). (1.5) 
Here 𝑓𝑒and 𝑔𝑒 are parental and government education spending when the child is in early 
childhood. The item 𝑖𝑒 in its entirety is a measure of early childhood inputs to education for the 
agent. Symmetrically, 𝑓𝑘 and 𝑔𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ {2,3,4} are parental and government education spending 
when the child is in late childhood and 𝑖𝑘 is a measure of late childhood inputs to education in 
the 𝑘𝑡ℎ period of childhood. Investment in each period is a c.e.s. combination of public and 
private expenditures where 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] gauges their relative importance and 𝜂 ≤ 1 gauges their 
substitutability. We allow government spending to be different in early and late childhood and 
their relative sizes will be a primary object of our investigation. 
For much of our investigation government spending within a period is the same for all 
agents but we also consider progressive government spending in early childhood. Parameters 
other than 𝑎 are common to all. From, equations (1.2)-(1.5), then, heterogeneity arises from 
differences in 𝑎,ℎ, 𝑓𝑒 , and 𝑓𝑘 and sometimes 𝑔𝑒. We have described the exogenous process 
governing 𝑎�. As described in the following section, ℎ,𝑓𝑒 , and 𝑓𝑘 will be endogenous responses 
to the series of shocks and government spending experienced by the dynasty. 
This human capital production process allows several distinctions between early and late 
childhood. The aggregate 𝑖𝑙 weighs the three stages of late childhood equally and makes them 
equally substitutable. In contrast, we can gauge the weight of early childhood and its 
substitutability with late childhood education through 𝛾 and Φ.  
Of course the various periods of later childhood might be similarly distinguished. 
Quality education, for example, might be more important in the early primary years than later. 
Also, the implied unit elasticity of these later stages implied by equation (1.4) may be too 
restrictive. However, we opt for this simpler specification as it more succinctly captures the 
singular role of early childhood. 
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 2.2 Agents' decisions 
Children make no economic choices. Parents allocate resources across consumption in 
the eleven periods of adulthood and education spending in the early and late childhood of their 
offspring in order to maximize 
𝑈 = �𝛽𝑗−1 𝑐4+𝑗𝜎
𝜎
11
𝑗=1
+ 𝜉 ℎ�𝜎
𝜎
. (1.6) 
Utility depends on consumption through adulthood. We use T to indicate the number of periods 
an agent has been an adult, so 𝑐4+𝑗 is consumption in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ period of an agent's adulthood. The 
discount rate on consumption is 𝛽 < 1 and 𝜎 < 1 gauges marginal utility. Agents also value the 
human capital of their offspring, ℎ� , and 𝜉 indicates the relative importance of child's 
accumulated human capital to the parent. Education spending influences accumulated human 
capital through equations (1.2)-(1.5). 
We consider borrowing constraints only in the first period of adulthood so the budget 
constraints can be written as 
𝑐5 + 𝑓𝑒 + 𝑏5 = 𝑤ℎ(1 − 𝜏) (1.7) 
�
𝑐4+𝑗
𝑟𝑗−1
11
𝑗=2
+ � 𝑓𝑗
𝑟𝑗−1
4
𝑗=2
= �(9
𝑗=2
  𝑧    𝑟  )𝑗−1𝑤ℎ(1 − 𝜏) + 𝑟𝑏5.  
Here 𝑤 > 0 is the wage rate per unit of human capital, 𝜏 ∈ [0,1] is the rate at which labor 
income is taxed and b₅ is bond holdings at the end of early adulthood. In general these can be 
positive or negative. However, we will consider also the impact of borrowing constraints in our 
sensitivity analysis. This will require 𝑏₅ ≥ 0. Each bond is a claim to 𝑟 units of output in the 
subsequent period. We assume that r is set in a world economy which accommodates any net 
saving or borrowing. As such, it is exogenous to our model. Income from bonds is untaxed. This 
simplifies the model without appreciably altering the results. 
We have three motivations for considering borrowing constraints only in early 
adulthood. First, evidence by Cunha et al. (2005) suggests that borrowing constraints are 
relevant to educational outcomes only early in the education process. Second, as discussed 
below, private spending on education is highest in early childhood. Government provides most 
education expenditures beyond that so there is little scope for constraints to restrain private 
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spending. Third, we find below that even constraints in early adulthood are of minor 
importance. As such more constraints do not warrant the additional complexity. 
The first line of equation (1.7) shows that in early adulthood, income net of taxes is 
allocated across current consumption, current education spending, and savings. The second line 
requires that the present discounted value of additional consumption and education spending 
must equal the present discounted value of additional income plus the return on first period 
savings. Through experience, agents in later life can be more productive. Though we do not 
model this process explicitly, we allow the possibility by including 𝑧 ≥ 1 as the experience 
premium. 
Output is linear in human capital employed. This convenience makes the wage rate 
exogenous. Since the wage equals the marginal product of labor in a competitive labor market, 
we use the same notation for each. With leisure unvalued in utility, all human capital is used in 
production. Total output then is 
𝑌 = 𝑤 ��ℎ−4 + �𝑧ℎ−5 + �𝑧2ℎ−6 + ⋯+ �𝑧8ℎ−12� = 𝑤𝐻. (1.8) 
We again use simplified notation. Y indicates total output at time t and H indicates the measure 
of human capital currently employed across dynasties. The first summation is over the human 
capital of workers currently in the first period of adulthood and the subscript indicates that they 
were born in period t-4. The second summation is over the human capital of workers in the 
second period of adulthood. This is scaled by z to reflect the gain from experience. Since nine 
generations are working, we have nine similar terms reflecting when the working generations 
were born and their current productivity. 
 2.3 Government 
    Government taxes labor income at rate τ, collecting revenue equal to τY. Holter (2010) shows 
that progressivity in the tax code can be important for reducing persistence. However, since we 
are focusing more narrowly on spending issues, we opt for this uniform taxation. Revenue is 
allocated across education expenditures for the N agents currently in early childhood and the N 
agents currently in each period of late childhood. Government must balance its budget in each 
period giving 
�𝑔𝑒 + 3𝑁𝑔𝑙 = 𝜏𝑌  
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where each g value has the t subscript. The summation is across the N agents in early childhood 
in period t indicating that government spending at this level can differ across agents. This 
allows us to consider the case of progressive spending at this level. Spending in late childhood 
is constant across agents so N indicates the number of agents at a particular stage receiving 
amount 𝑔𝑙 and the 3 indicates that three stages are funded. 
The value τ measures not only the tax rate but also the share of output allocated to 
government education spending. We investigate the effects of tax level τ and the allocation of 
tax across early and late childhood, thus we define 
Ϛ𝑒 = ∑𝑔𝑒𝑌 , Ϛ𝑙 = 𝑁𝑔𝑙𝑌   
such that Ϛe is the share of output allocated by government to early childhood and Ϛl is the share 
allocated to each of the periods of late childhood. 
 3 Calibration 
We calibrate parameter values to form a baseline economy that matches the U.S. data. 
When available, we use empirical counterparts to the parameters of our model. In other cases, 
we choose parameters so that features of the generated data match features of the U.S. economy. 
Table 1-1 shows our choice of directly calibrated parameters. 
    Table 1-1. Parameters set exogenously 
Description Parameters Values 
Innate ability scalar 𝑎� 1 
Intergenerational persistence of innate ability ρ 0.25 
Weight of private spending α 0.5 
Returns on educational expenditures parameter μ 0.159 
Substitutability parameter of private and public expenditures η 0.95 
Substitutability parameter of early and late childhood expenditures Φ -1.8 
Discount rate β 0.815 
Intertemporal preference parameter σ 0 
Wage rate w 1 
Wage growth rate z 1.054 
Interest rate r 1.05 
% of GDP on early childhood education by government 𝜍𝑒 0.4 
% of GDP on late childhood education per period by government 𝜍𝑙 1.2 
 
The first two parameters govern the transference of ability. The first serves only to scale 
the economy so we normalize 𝑎 = 1. Our specification of ρ is meant to capture only the genetic 
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aspects of ability transference. Since direct observations of ability are not available, researchers 
consider proxies. For example, Black et al. (2008) show that the intergenerational persistence of 
IQ scores is 0.32. However, the IQ measure is a combination of innate ability (nature) and 
malleable ability (nurture). For our purposes, this measure may overstate the persistence of 
ability. As such, we consider 0.32 to be an upper bound in a later sensitivity analysis and set 
𝜌 = 0.25 in the baseline economy. This is in line with work by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) 
and Holter (2010). These authors calibrate ρ so that the intergenerational correlation of earnings 
in generated data matches observed values and arrive at values ranging from 0.2 to 0.332. 
The next four rows consider parameters of human capital production. Of these, the first 
two are share parameters and the others gauge elasticities. We set 𝛼 = 0.5 so that neither public 
nor private spending is inherently more productive in generating human capital. It can be argued 
that since families know better the needs of their children, their expenditures are more targeted 
and effective; i.e. 𝛼 > 0.5. Alternatively, it can be argued that government has more 
accumulated experience in providing human capital and thus spends more effectively; i.e. 𝛼 < 
0.5. Our choice reflects neutrality on this issue. 
The parameter μ gauges the importance of education quality in generating human 
capital. With 𝑤 = 1, earnings in our model is 𝑤ℎ = ℎ. So μ also governs the importance of 
education quality for earnings. Card and Krueger (1996) provide a comprehensive summary of 
the empirical literature relating education quality and earnings. With quality being measured by 
expenditures per student, researchers estimate the impact of quality by regressing earnings on 
education expenditures. Card and Krueger calculated that the estimates have a mean of 0.159, 
with an interquartile ranging from 0.085 to 0.195. We follow their results and choose 𝜇 = 
0.159. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) calibrate this parameter in the context of their model and 
use 𝜇 = 0.24. We take this value as an upper bound in our sensitivity analysis. 
It is common in the literature to treat public spending as highly substitutable with private 
spending. This is because for many education inputs, the source of funding is irrelevant to its 
productivity. For example, whether government or a family purchases a computer for 
coursework should have no impact on its effectiveness. Some researchers assume these inputs 
are perfectly substitutable, i.e. 𝜂 = 1.5
                                                 
5 See Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Holter (2010) and Abington and Blankenau (2011). 
 However, families might allocate some of their 
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expenditures to items complementary to public education spending such as software for a 
computer or some types of tutoring. In this case, substitution is not perfect; i.e. 𝜂 < 1. This 
assumption is also common.6
As mentioned above, evidence suggests that education quality in late childhood is not a 
good substitute for education quality in early childhood. Estimates of elasticity of substitution 
between early and late childhood are scarce but support the case of complementarity. Cunha et 
al. (2010) estimate a parameter somewhat analogous to our Φ. They consider substitutability of 
investment during early childhood and later investment through age 12 in forming cognitive 
skills. They provide an estimate of 𝛷 = −1.373 and indicate that the value is decreasing with 
age. This is because spending becomes less effective in improving acquired skills as children 
age. Because we are considering a period including children to age 20, we use this as an upper 
bound in our sensitivity analysis and set Φ = −1.8 in our baseline case. This value is further 
motivated by the work of Caucutt and Lochner (2011). They calculate a complementarity 
parameter over two twelve year periods of Φ  = −1.67. Since our distinction is between two 
more starkly different learning episodes, it is reasonable that input in our model are more 
complementary. 
 We follow the precedent of assuming government and family 
inputs to be highly substitutable by setting 𝜂 = 0.95. One advantage of setting 𝜂 < 1 is that in 
equilibrium, private education spending is positive for all families. Nordblom (2003) finds that 
for most families, parents provide basic school supplies, lodging, and "within the family" 
education prior to college. Even the poorest families incur some expenses for such informal 
investment. We consider alternative values of η in our sensitivity analysis. We show that the 
effectiveness of public education spending in reducing persistence decreases as 𝜂 falls and is 
eliminated at 𝜂 =0. 
For preference parameters we set the discount factor β to 0.815 and the elasticity 
parameter σ to 0. The discount rate corresponds to the commonly used annual rate of 0.96. The 
elasticity parameter corresponds to log preferences. Log preferences are common in the 
literature and are in line with empirical estimates.7 Other estimates range between 𝜎 = −0.5 and 
−2 so we consider 𝜎 = −2 as a lower bound in the sensitivity analysis.8
                                                 
6 Studies that specify inputs as imperfect substitutes include Arcalean and Schiopu (2010), Bearse et al. (2005) and 
Nordblom (2003). 
 
7 See Beaudry and Wincoopn (1996) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). 
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We next consider items that determine the present value of lifetime income, w, z, and r. 
The wage rate only scales the economy so we normalize it to 1. Our value for z comes from 
Heckman et al. (2006). Using their estimates from a Mincer earnings regression, we calculate 
that earnings increased by 52.63 percent with 40 years of working experience. This corresponds 
to 𝑧 = 1.054 in the context of our model. This value is somewhat larger than the estimate by 
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). They use the data from the 1990 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and obtain a 15 year wage growth rate of 12 percent. For our 5 year periods 
this corresponds to z = 1.039. We take this value as a lower bound in our sensitivity analysis. 
The first-order conditions in our model reduce to 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
= 𝑟𝛽. We choose interest rate r = 1.05 to 
target a consumption growth rate of 5.2 percent calculated by Lee et al. (2006). 
The final parameters of Table 1-1 are the policy parameters 𝜍𝑒 and 𝜍𝑙.  They represent 
public expenditures on early childhood and each stage of late childhood as a percentage of 
GDP. Education at a Glance (2007) shows that public expenditures on primary education, lower 
secondary and upper secondary education represent 1.7, 0.97 and 0.93 percent of GDP. Upon 
adjusting for the number of students at each level, per pupil expenditures are the highest for 
upper secondary students. However, the difference is small and to avoid notational complexity, 
we assume in our baseline economy that public spending on late childhood education is equally 
distributed across three periods totally 15 years. Thus we set 𝜍𝑙 constant across the three stages 
of late childhood using the average of these values; i.e. 𝜍𝑙  = 0.012. Heymann et al. (2004) report 
and compare government expenditures on early childhood education and care by the United 
States and its European peers. They find that 0.4 percent of U.S. GDP is spent by government 
on early education. Accordingly, we set 𝜍𝑒 = 0.004. 
The four remaining parameters are chosen so that the model generates observed features 
of the U.S. economy. Table 1-2 lists these parameters and values as well as the targets. 
Table 1-2. Parameters set endogenously 
Description  Value Target Data Model 
s.e. of random shocks to innate ability 𝜎𝑎 0.775 Gini index 0.470 0.465 
Contribution of parental human capital ν 0.142 Persistence 0.440 0.442 
Weight of early childhood γ 0.475 𝑓1/(𝑓1 + 𝑔1) 0.60 0.56 
Discount rate on children’s human capital ξ 1.3 �𝑓𝑘 /(3𝑔𝑙 + �𝑓𝑘) 0.086 0.085 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
8 See Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Hubbard et al. (1994). 
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The parameter 𝜎𝑎 has a strong influence on the Gini coefficient of our generated data. 
As such we choose it to match the Gini coefficient reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Our 
model generates a value of 0.47 when we set 𝜎𝑎 = 0.775. 
We choose ν to target the intergenerational earnings persistence. Corak (2006) reviews 
empirical work on earnings persistence and offers a cross country comparison of earnings 
mobility. The study shows that income persistence varies significantly among developed 
countries. The United States has a high intergenerational elasticity of earnings of 0.47 (see 
Grawe (2004)), while this number is much smaller in European countries.9 Other researchers 
find the value of θ to be around 0.4.10
Persistence is generally estimated in the following regression 
 We choose a midpoint and target earnings persistence of 
0.44. 
𝑙𝑛 𝑦 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽₁𝑙𝑛 𝑦₋₁ + 𝜀  
where y is adult income of children and 𝑦₋₁ is parent income. Here 𝛽0 is a constant term and the 
error term ε includes other factors that influence children's income. The estimate of interest 𝛽₁ 
reflects the intergenerational persistence of earnings. Upon generating data we run the same 
regression with 𝑦 = 𝑤ℎ and 𝑦₋₁ = 𝑤ℎ. 
Persistence in earnings has three sources in our model. First, rich parents are more likely 
to have high ability. Their children inherit this in part if ρ > 0. Second, parents with higher 
earnings tend to invest more in children's education. The third source of persistence is through a 
direct socioeconomic effect of parental human capital when ν > 0. Becker and Tomes (1979, 
1986) and Solon (2004) include a fixed endowment in human capital accumulation and allow 
the endowment to be partly inherited by children. Explaining this inheritable endowment, 
Roemer (2004) points out that beyond innate ability, parents can positively influence children 
through a family culture that values skills and discipline and through social connections that 
facilitate access to jobs and opportunities. There is also some evidence that parents with higher 
human capital affect children's earnings positively through a better family environment and 
                                                 
9 Intergenerational persistence of earnings is 0.15 in Denmark, 0.17 in Norway, 0.18 in Finland, and 0.32 in 
Germany (see Corak, (2006)). 
10 Examples include Solon (1992), Hyson (2003), and Levine and Mazumder (2002). 
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higher quality parenting.11
We choose ξ and γ jointly to match observed patterns of private participation in funding 
education. Total private expenditures are influenced strongly by ξ and its allocation is 
influenced by γ. Barnett and Masse (2003) estimate that about 60 percent of early childhood 
spending is private so we target 𝑓1
𝑔1+𝑓1
= 0.6. Using data from Education at a Glance (2007), we 
find that expenditures on primary and secondary education by households represent 8.6 percent 
of total expenditures from all sources. Therefore we target ∑𝑓𝑘
3𝑔𝑙+∑𝑓𝑘
= 0.086, 𝑘 ∈ {2,3,4}. 
 We target persistence through this third channel and generate 
persistence equivalent to 0.442 with 𝜈 = 0.142. 
We are able to get near the target values by setting γ = .475 and ξ = 1.3. There are not 
clear counterparts to these measures in the literature but both appear to be reasonable values. At 
γ = .25 all stages of education are weighed equally. Evidence on the importance of early 
childhood spending suggests that γ should exceed this value by a considerable amount. 
Government spending on early education in the U.S. is relatively low compared to European 
Countries, so the share of parental spending is relatively high. This may result in an 
overestimated value of γ. We consider a lower bound of 𝛾 = 0.4 in the sensitivity check. With ξ 
> 0, parents value children's human capital that transfers to income in the labor market. With ξ = 
1.3, parents' altruism is defensible since human capital affects children's labor market outcome 
through the following 9 working periods. The relatively high level of U.S. government spending 
in late childhood generates a small share of parental spending. Thus the corresponding discount 
rate of children’s education, ξ, may be underestimated. We consider  𝜉 = 1.5 in the sensitivity 
check. 
 4 Current Policy 
Education in early childhood differs from late childhood through the human capital 
production function and through government funding. Absent these distinctions we should 
expect changes in government spending at the different levels to yield similar results. In this 
section we show that in fact increased expenditures in early childhood have much larger effects 
on persistence. We then investigate which distinctions drive this result. Insights from this 
investigation suggest that increased government funding of early childhood at the lower end of 
                                                 
11 See McLanahan (2004) and Cunha and Heckman (2010). 
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the income distribution is key to reducing persistence. This motivates an investigation of a 
progressive allocation of government spending. 
To set the stage for this investigation, we first demonstrate the impact of current 
government policy. To do this, we compare the economy in the case where government does 
not spend on education (𝜍𝑒 = 𝜍𝑙 = 0) to the case where it spends at current levels. The results of 
this experiment are reported in Table 1-3. In the third through seventh rows we have normalized 
the measure by the value it takes in our baseline model. 
Comparing the first and second column, we see that government spending has a 
substantial effect on persistence. Spending at current levels yields intergenerational persistence 
of income equal to 0.442. Absent government intervention in education, this would rise by 17 
percent to 0.518. Spending also influences the distribution of income within a generation. The 
second row of Table 1-3 shows that absent government spending on education, the Gini 
coefficient would be about 4 percent higher. 
      Table 1-3. Policy experiments 
Variable Baseline No public spending % Change 
Persistence of earnings 0.442 0.518 17 
Gini coefficient 0.465 0.485 4 
Output 1 0.86 -14 
Utility 1 0.89 -11 
Education expenditure 1 0.49 -51 
f₁ 1 1.13 13 
f₂+f₃+f₄ 1 4.92 394 
     
Decreased persistence and inequality of income are accompanied by a higher level of 
average output and utility. The third row shows that output would be 13 percent lower without 
government spending. The loss in utility is equivalent to a decrease of 11 percent in 
consumption at each period of adulthood. Since dynasties are homogeneous except for random 
productivity shocks, we can think of this average utility in the steady state as an expected utility. 
It is instructive to consider why expected utility increases. Since the tax is proportional to 
income and all agents receive the same government spending, government spending is a transfer 
from wealthier families to less wealthy families. Prior to the realization of shocks, dynasties do 
not know if they will be poor in any period, so the current policy has an insurance aspect to it, 
which serves to increase expected utility. A second effect arises if families do not highly value 
the human capital of their children. At the extreme, consider the case where ξ = 0. Parents do 
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not value children's education at all. Therefore human capital and consumption in the steady 
state are zero absent government involvement. Any increment to government spending would 
have an infinite effect on utility. With our setting of ξ = 1.3, this effect is still at play, though to 
a lesser extent. We find that agents from rich families also obtain higher utility with government 
spending. At any given period, government spending lowers their utility since it is a net transfer 
from them to the poor. Intertemporally, however, they are better off since the policy in the prior 
period yielded more spending on their behalf. 
Digging a bit deeper, we see that these effects result from changes in education funding. 
Absent government spending, education spending would be 51 percent lower in total. Family 
spending in early childhood would be 13 percent higher and family spending in late childhood 
would be nearly 5 times as high. The larger change for later childhood reflects that government 
spends more at this level. 
 
Figure 1-1. Family and government spending on early and late childhood education 
 
Figure 1 helps to explain how government spending reduces persistence through 
weakening the link between family income and education investment. The first panel shows the 
weakening of this relationship for early childhood. The first bar in each pairing shows family 
spending in early childhood for an income quintile of the population and the second bar shows 
total spending at this level when government spending is positive. It further decomposes this 
total into family and government spending, where government spending is the same in each 
quintile. The first pairing considers families in the lowest quintile of the population and 
subsequent pairings consider other quintiles in ascending order. Absent government spending, 
families are the only spenders on education. Family spending in the upper quintile is 4 times 
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higher than that in the lowest quintile. With government spending, total expenditure in the upper 
quintile is only twice that of the lowest quintile. 
The narrowing of these ratios has two causes. The first is simply algebraic. A common 
amount of government spending has a smaller proportional effect when family spending is high. 
The other cause is differences in the responsiveness of family spending to government 
spending. From comparing the solid bars in each pairing, we see that government spending 
displaces more family spending for the wealthy than for the poor. There are two causes of this 
difference in crowding out. When government spends on a level of education, families can opt 
to lower their own spending and allocate more of their income to consumption or to the other 
level of education. However, for the families that spend little on education absent government 
spending, private spending can at most be driven to zero by significant government spending, so 
crowding out cannot be large. The other limiting force on crowding out for poor families arises 
from decreasing marginal productivity of education spending. When total spending on early 
childhood is low, its marginal product is high. Thus cutting back on spending yields greater 
decreases in human capital for the poor than for the wealthy. This makes family spending by the 
poor less responsive to government spending. 
With early childhood spending, none of the crowding out is severe. Even for the highest 
income families, the decrease in private spending is only 37 percent of the increase in 
government spending. As a result, the relationship between family income and total expenditure 
is weakened, but by a relatively modest amount. The second panel shows more dramatic effects 
along these lines for late childhood education. With no government spending, the most wealthy 
quintile spends about 4 times as much as the least wealthy. With government spending this ratio 
is reduced to 1.26.  Crowding out of private spending is severe at each quintile. In the highest 
quintile the decrease in private spending is now 62 percent of the increase in government 
spending. In the lowest quintile, private spending is driven close to zero. The larger crowding 
out for late childhood is largely due to the higher level of government spending at this stage. 
Figure 2 tells the story from another perspective. In the first panel, the solid curve 
represents the Lorenz curve for private spending on early childhood education𝑓₁ in the baseline 
economy, and the dashed curve is the Lorenz curve for 𝑓₁ with no government spending. Since 
the solid curve is further to the right, the introduction of government spending is shown to make 
private spending more unequal as measured by the Gini coefficient. The greatest shift occurs in 
the low end of the spending distribution and this is due principally to spending being driven to 
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almost zero for nearly 20 percent of the population. This shift of family spending distribution 
translates to more equal total spending. First, all those with almost zero family spending 
experience the same total spending. Secondly, as shown above, private spending falls more for 
the wealthier so the gap in spending among the more wealthy and less wealthy falls. 
The second panel shows a more dramatic shift of the Lorenz curves for private spending 
on late childhood education. Comparing the solid and dashed curves, we find government 
spending in late childhood drives private spending to zero for more than 80 percent of the 
population. Each of these families has same level of total spending. Given this, the link between 
total investment in late childhood education and family income is broken for the majority of 
families. This is the main cause for a lower intergenerational persistence in earnings. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2. The Lorenz curves of private spending in early and late childhood before and 
after introducing current policy 
 5 Policy experiments 
We establish above that government education funding at observed levels has a number 
of positive effects. We now consider the impact of changing government funding from its 
baseline levels. We first consider the effects of equalizing government spending across all 
stages with no net increase in spending. This requires increasing early childhood spending and 
decreasing late childhood spending. Since currently 𝜍𝑒 + 3𝜍𝑙 = 0.04, we set 𝜍𝑒 = 𝜍𝑙 = (0.04/4) 
= 0.01. We then consider equalizing early and late spending by increasing government spending 
   
   
   
   
 S
ha
re
 o
f p
riv
at
e 
sp
en
di
ng
 o
n 
la
te
 c
hi
ld
ho
od
 
   
   
   
   
   
0 
   
   
   
 0
.2
5 
   
   
   
0.
50
   
   
   
   
0.
75
   
   
   
   
 1
 
   
   
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
riv
at
e 
sp
en
di
ng
  i
n 
ea
rly
 c
hi
ld
ho
od
 
   
   
   
 0
   
   
   
  0
.2
5 
   
   
   
0.
50
   
   
   
   
0.
75
   
   
   
   
 1
 
0          0.25          0.50          0.75           1 
         Cumulative share of population 
     0           0.25          0.50          0.75          1 
            Cumulative share of population 
20 
 
in early childhood and keeping government spending in late childhood unchanged. This requires 
that early childhood funding be increased by 0.8 percent of GDP. In the third experiment, we 
consider increasing government spending on late childhood while leaving expenditures in early 
childhood unchanged. To facilitate a comparison, we again increase total spending by 0.8 
percent of GDP but now allocate the increased expenditures equally across the three periods of 
late childhood. We find that an increase of education expenditures on early childhood has larger 
effects on earnings persistence, income inequality and total output. To further examine this case, 
we consider progressive government spending on early education in the last experiment. We 
increase government expenditures on early education by 0.8 percent of GDP again but allocate 
the funding only to the lowest income quintile. 
 5.1  Results 
Table 1-4 shows the impact of these policy changes. The first column of data reiterates 
the features of baseline economy. The second shows the effects of redistributing the current 
level of spending. The third and fourth columns show the effects of increasing early and late 
childhood spending holding the other constant. The last column shows the effects of subsidizing 
the lowest income group through an increase in early childhood spending. 
Consider first the effects on the persistence of earnings. A reallocation decreases 
persistence from 0.442 to 0.412. Thus persistence can be considerably altered with no increase 
in total spending. The third data column shows that by spending on early childhood at the rate in 
late childhood, persistence drops further to 0.405. If this same increment is spent on late 
childhood education, the result is not a decrease in persistence, but rather an increase. The final 
column again considers the same increment to early childhood. However, here the increased 
expenditures are allocated to the poorest 20 percent of the population. The persistence of 
earnings is further reduced to 0.398. 
Before looking deeper into the results regarding persistence, we first consider some 
other ways in which the different experiments change the economy. The second row shows that 
the Gini index is most effectively reduced by an increment to spending on early childhood. With 
both broad-based and progressive spending, the measure drops from .465 to .458. In contrast, 
spending more on late childhood has almost no effect. A simple reallocation has a modest effect 
in lowering this measure of inequality. 
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      Table 1-4. Impact of policy changes 
Variable Current spending Current spending+0.8% GDP 
 Baseline Reallocation Early 
 
Late 
 
Early 
 Persistence 0.442 0.412 0.405 0.445 0.398 Gini index 0.465 0.460 0.458 0.466 0.458 
Ed. 
 
1 0.96 1.14 1.18 1.18 
Ed. quality 1 1.11 1.35 1.11 1.23 
Output 1 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.03 
Utility 1 1.05 1.09 1.02 1.05 
f₁ 1 0.30 0.25 1.02 1.01 
f₂+f₃+f₄ 1 1.27 1 0.91 0.98 
*The increased 0.8 percent of GDP on early childhood is allocated to the first quintile. 
 
The third row considers total education expenditures. When government spending 
increases, as in the final three columns, the result is an increase in total education spending. 
However when government spending is held constant but reallocated toward early childhood, 
family spending falls. With government spending unchanged, total spending falls, as shown in 
the second column. This is mostly due to the crowding out in early childhood. The next line 
shows that despite the fall in total spending, a reallocation of expenditures toward early 
childhood results in an increase in education quality. In the baseline model, early education 
spending is relatively low and thus has a relatively high marginal return. In contrast, late 
education is relatively abundant and has a lower marginal return. The policy decreases total 
spending but allocates it more efficiently. More specifically, education quality, as defined in 
equation (1.3), increases by 11 percent in the case of reallocation. The relative scarcity of early 
childhood spending explains also why an increment to government spending in late childhood 
has a smaller effect on quality than an equal spending increment on early education. This is 
shown in columns three and four. 
Output and utility both rise across all columns. Spending on late childhood has positive 
but the lowest effects to the third decimal. While broad-based spending in early childhood has 
the largest effect on output, it is less effective than progressive spending in reducing persistence. 
This suggests a trade-off between persistence and output. 
From row seven we see that family spending in early childhood drops off sharply when 
expenditures are reallocated and even more when new expenditures are directed to early 
childhood. In the latter case family spending is only 25 percent as much as the spending level in 
the baseline economy. However, private spending increases slightly when these same 
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expenditures are allocated progressively. This is because the extra resources are being directed 
almost exclusively to families who spend nearly nothing on early childhood. This shuts down 
the channel for crowding out while the increment to income has a positive effect on spending. 
The result is increased private spending despite increased public spending. The subsequent row 
shows that increased government spending in late childhood leads to a reduction of private 
spending at the same stage. However, these effects are smaller than the analogous changes in 
the previous row. 
 5.2 Persistence 
We now consider the effect on persistence more deeply. Since a reallocation is both an 
increase in early spending and a decrease in late spending, we gain insights into the reallocation 
from first considering the other two cases. The third column shows that increasing 𝜍𝑒 to current 
𝜍𝑙 levels decreases persistence by 8.4 percent to 0.405. While this is a general equilibrium 
adjustment, three factors are key to explaining this relatively large effect. 
First, an increase in government spending at this stage crowds out private spending 
mostly for the wealthiest agents. For the poorest agents, private spending is small, so there is 
little scope for crowding out. Hence, increasing government spending causes a larger increment 
in total spending for the poor families. This weakens the link between income and education 
quality and hence reduces the income persistence. 
In addition, an increase in government spending also increases the share of the 
population that receives the same level of total spending. This is the second key to reducing 
persistence and is clear from the first panel of Figure 3 below.  The first panel of Figure 3 shows 
how the Lorenz curve of family spending on early childhood changes when government 
spending increases. The curve shifts substantially to the right. This is largely due to an 
expansion of the region where agents spend nearly zero. Stated differently, the policy expands 
significantly the share of the population for whom education spending in early childhood is not 
dependent upon private income but rather upon government finance. This further weakens the 
relationship between expenditures and income. The more equal education spending is shown in 
the third panel of Figure 3. The third panel of Figure 3 shows the shift of the Lorenz curve of 
total spending on early education. The leftward movement of the curve implies that education 
spending becomes almost unvarying across the population. 
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Figure  
 
Figure 1-3. The Lorenz curves of private spending and total spending on early and late 
childhood education before and after an increase in government spending on early 
childhood education 
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The third key factor works counter to this. Education expenditure directly increases 
education quality and higher education quality is transformed to higher human capital. The 
productivity of education quality, though, varies by children's ability and parental human 
capital. Higher income families tend to have higher ability children with higher parental human 
capital, so a unit increment in education quality is more productive for the wealthier families. 
As a result, an increase in government spending can strengthen the link between income across 
generations. However, in considering early childhood spending, this effect is relatively small 
and thus public expenditure at this level is still effective in reducing persistence. 
The fourth column in Table 1-4 shows that increased government spending in late 
childhood can increase persistence. The same three factors are key to understanding this. Again, 
an increase in government spending at this stage crowds out private spending mostly for the 
wealthiest agents. However, for around 80 percent of the population, private spending is near 
zero at this stage. When government spends more, there is no change in the distribution of 
education spending across most of the population. Thus, the effect of the first factor is 
diminished. Also, since most agents are already spending near zero, there is only a slight 
increase in the number of agents supported by the spending floor. This is shown in the second 
panel of Figure 4 above. An increase in government expenditures on late childhood shifts the 
Lorenz curve of private spending to the right, causing more agents to spend near zero. However, 
in comparison with the first panel in Figure 3, the change is fairly small. Thus the second effect 
is also weakened. The third (negative) effect is larger in the case of late childhood spending. A 
common increase in spending on late childhood education is more productive for the children 
from rich families, not only due to their higher value of innate ability and higher parental human 
capital, but also due to their higher education quality in early childhood. Extra spending on later 
education only widens the income gap that was developed through unequal early education 
quality. 
The second and third experiments explain the effect on persistence of the first 
experiment. The increase in spending in early childhood decreases persistence significantly. 
Following from the results of increasing spending in late childhood, a decrease in spending 
would reduce persistence slightly. All told, then, the reallocation leads to lower persistence. 
Equalizing expenditure through a pure increase in early childhood spending has an even larger 
effect. 
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In the fourth experiment, we allocate the 0.8 percent of GDP on early education to 
agents in the first quintile of the income distribution. It generates a lower persistence than 
broad-based spending. This is due to the larger effect of the first factor. With more government 
spending on each family in the poorest group, crowding out is smaller and the floor on early 
education spending is raised to a higher level compared to the case of broad-based spending. 
With less agents affected by the extra spending, the effect of the second factor is smaller. 
However, overall, the stronger effect of the first factor dominates and it induces a larger change 
in persistence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4. The Lorenz curves of private spending on early and late childhood education 
before and after an increase in government spending on late childhood education 
 5.3 Driving factors 
To this point, we have established that government spending on early childhood is more 
effective in reducing intergenerational persistence than government spending on late childhood. 
Our explanation has focused largely on differences in the level of government education 
funding across these two levels. However, we have modeled early childhood education as 
having two distinct features. First, we have made it relatively more important in generating 
human capital than later education. This is due to our setting γ = 0.475. If all expenditures were 
of equal importance we would have γ = 0.25. Secondly, we have made early and later education 
complements in production by setting Φ = −2. If early education shared unit elasticity of 
substitution with education at other levels we would have Φ = 0. 
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In this subsection, we evaluate whether these modeling distinctions are important for our 
results. To do this, we investigate the extent to which spending on early childhood influences 
persistence when we remove these distinctions. Table 1-5 reports the results. 
The first row is our baseline case and is repeated for ease of comparison. In the second 
row we maintain the relative importance of early childhood but set Φ = 0. In the third row, we 
maintain Φ = −2but set γ = 0.25. In the final row, we remove both distinctions. The first data 
column gives the level of persistence for the new parameterization with baseline funding. The 
next column calculates the persistence when early childhood expenditures are increased and the 
final column gives the percentage change. 
       Table 1-5. Impact on persistence with Φ=0, γ=0.25 
Setting Baseline economy Early childhood+0.8% 
 
% Change 
Φ =-2, γ=0.475 0.442 0.405 8.4 
Φ =0, γ=0.475 0.433 0.403 7.0 
Φ =-2, γ=0.25 0.427 0.402 7.0 
Φ =0, γ=0.25 0.413 0.403 2.4 
        
The key message is that each feature of our model contributes to making early childhood 
spending an effective means of reducing persistence. With both features in place, increased 
funding reduces persistence by 8.4 percent. Removing any one feature changes the reduction to 
about 7 percent. With both features removed, increased funding would reduce persistence by 
only 2.4 percent. 
We conclude that each feature is important and the combination of these features is 
especially important in establishing the effectiveness of early childhood education. However, 
when we remove these features, spending on early childhood is still more effective than 
spending on late childhood. We attribute this to differences in the level of education funding at 
early and late stages. 
 5.4  Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we calibrate the model and comment on some alternative 
parameterization.  In this section we evaluate the extent to which these alternative parameters 
influence our results. The first column of Table 1-6 below gives the alternative values of various 
parameters. The following values in parenthesis are the baseline parameter values. The next 
column shows persistence with the alternative parameter at baseline spending. The subsequent 
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columns show how this value changes with an increment to early and late childhood education 
spending. 
The first row repeats the baseline case. The key result from the remainder of the table is 
that these alternative parameter choices have only modest effects on both persistence and the 
effectiveness of policy in reducing persistence. The second row shows that higher persistence in 
ability (ρ) leads to higher persistence in income. A consequence of this unsurprising result is 
that policy is less effective. This is because a greater share of persistence is attributable to 
immutable inherited ability. When the return on education investment (μ) is larger, so is 
persistence and policy effectiveness. The substitutability of early and late childhood (Φ), the 
intertemporal preference parameter (σ), wage growth (z), the share of early education (γ) and the 
discount rate of children’s human capital all have modest effects on policy effectiveness. 
        Table 1-6. Sensitivity check 
Parameters Persistence Early childhood Late childhood 
Baseline 0.442 -8.4 +0.7 
ρ=0.32 (0.25) 0.488 -7.2 +0.4 
μ=0.24 (0.159) 0.482 -9.1 -0.2 
Φ =-1.373 (-1.8) 0.441 -8.1 +0.3 
σ=-2 (0) 0.500 -7.8 -0.1 
z=1.039 (1.054) 0.443 -8.3 +0.5 
γ=0.4 (0.475) 0.432 -8.2 +0.1 
ξ=1.5 (1.3) 0.436 -8.2 +0.0 
Borrowing 
 
0.442 -8.4 +0.5 
 
We proceed and consider borrowing constraints in early adulthood. This requires bond 
holdings in the first period of adulthood to be non-negative, i.e. 𝑏₅ ≥ 0 in equation (1.7). We 
find that with the parameter setting in our baseline model, borrowing constraint is binding, i.e. 
𝑏₅ < 0 for some agents, not all. As shown in the last row of Table 1-6, having borrowing 
constraints does not affect persistence or the effectiveness of early spending. 
    A more crucial parameter in our model is the substitutability of government and private 
spending. Crowding out of private spending by government spending is a key to our results. 
When these inputs are less substitutable, we should expect our results to be less pronounced. In 
the baseline economy, we assume that government and private expenditure on early childhood 
education are close to perfect substitutes with η = 0.95. Table 1-7 below shows that this setting 
is not required for our results to hold. However, considerable substitutability is needed.   
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       Table 1-7. Changes in persistence in more complementary cases 
Substitutability Persistence Early childhood Late childhood 
η=0.95 
 
0.442 -8.4 +0.5 
η=0.90 0.442 -7.8 +0.4 
η=0.5 0.448 -2.8 -0.3 
η=0 0.454 0 0 
η=-1 0.456 +3.7 +0.2 
 
The first row of Table 1-7 reiterates the baseline case, showing the generated persistence 
in the first column and the percentage change in persistence from increasing early and late 
spending in the next two columns. In each case the increment is again 0.8 percent of GDP.  
From this and the subsequent row we see that moving away modestly from η=0.95 has only a 
small effect on our results. Persistence does not change and early spending is a bit less effective 
in reducing persistence.  As we move further to less substitutability, the changes become more 
pronounced. At 𝜂 = 0.5 persistence rises to 0.448, and increasing early spending decreases 
persistence by only 2.8 percent.  At 𝜂 = 0 the effect on persistence is fully eliminated and in the 
complementary case where 𝜂 = −1, spending on early childhood increases persistence. 
This pattern emerges because of the way in which public spending affects private 
spending. When public and private spending are close to perfect substitutes, more government 
spending decreases the marginal product of private spending. Thus more public spending yields 
less private spending. We have established that this crowding out is more severe among the 
rich. When public and private spending are sufficiently complementary, more government 
spending increases the marginal product of private spending. This increases private spending 
and again the effect is more pronounced among the wealthy. With spending higher for the 
wealthy, income persistence is reinforced. 
 6 Conclusion 
In the United States, there is a strong correlation between the income of parents and their 
offspring. With intergenerational persistence of income equal to about .44, the mobility of 
economic status across generations is lower in the U.S. than in most other OECD countries.12
                                                 
12 See Corak (2006). 
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Education is one source of persistence. Wealthier families provide a better education to their 
offspring. This results in more human capital and a higher wage. Public education can lower 
persistence by weakening the link between parental income and the education quality received 
by their offspring. However, public expenditure is the dominant source of education funding 
only after a child enters primary school. Through the formative years of early childhood, 
education quality can differ considerably and depend strongly on parental income. Relatively 
equal spending through the primary and secondary years serves in part to amplify differences 
developed prior to the first day of school. 
This paper considers changes to public education funding when early childhood 
education plays a unique role in the development of human capital and is funded primarily by 
families. We embed these features into a life cycle model where human capital is accumulated 
throughout early childhood and three periods of late childhood. Building on studies of early 
childhood, we capture this unique role by making early education highly complementary with 
later education and giving it a relatively high weight in the human capital production function. 
These features aggravate the negative lifetime consequences of poor education quality in early 
childhood. 
We calibrate the model to replicate features of the U.S. economy and run experiments to 
examine the effects of education policy on income persistence. We find that increasing 
government spending on early education is most effective in reducing persistence. Increasing 
public spending on later education may even increase persistence. The unique role of early 
education and the relative paucity of public funding at this level combine to explain the 
difference in policy effectiveness. An increment to early public childhood spending largely 
offsets private spending for wealthier families so that total spending changes little. For lower 
income families, in contrast, this same spending increment results in higher total spending. The 
resulting tighter spending distribution weakens the income/expenditure link and lowers 
persistence. With early childhood playing a central role in human capital production, this effect 
is amplified. In contrast, most spending on later childhood education is already provided 
publicly. Except for the very high end of the income distribution, there is little scope for further 
equalization of expenditures. As such, there is little scope for further reducing persistence. 
Since government spending is most effective in raising education investment for agents 
at the low end of the income distribution, we consider progressive spending on early childhood. 
Our results imply a larger change in persistence from progressive spending than from broad-
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based spending. However, the lower persistence is accompanied by a smaller increase in output. 
This is because the less wealthy, on average, have lower productivity in generating human 
capital. Targeting the least wealthy directs resources from agents with a higher return to 
education quality to agents with a lower return. 
Since college education has been considered by both Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and 
Holter (2010), we have chosen to focus on the dichotomy between early and late childhood. In 
this paper we have considered only physical investment at these different stages. However, 
parents make considerable time investments in their children. This investment contributes to the 
development of human capital, especially in early childhood. In future work, we will consider 
the effects of government spending and tax policy when parents invest both income and time. 
Since government spending cannot substitute for parental time, this could add an interesting 
additional layer to policy analysis. While crowding out private spending, policy may also alter 
the incentives of parents to work less and spend more time with children. 
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Chapter 2 - Parental time investment in early education and the 
labor supply of young parents 
 1 Introduction 
There is compelling evidence from economics and sociology that early education plays a 
unique role in human capital accumulation.13 Quality learning in early years has long-term 
effects on educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Missed opportunities to invest in 
young children can not be easily compensated by later investment. Economists capture this 
feature by modeling human capital formation in a hierarchical fashion, where early and later 
education interact in producing human capital.14 Most studies consider expenditures by parents 
and the government as the only education input.15
This parental time investment is valuable to early development. Numerous 
developmental studies show that parenting in early childhood is crucial to the growth of 
children's cognitive and social skills.
 However, many parents invest large amounts 
of time teaching their young children words, numbers and manners by reading and talking to 
them. Such investments are an indirect cost of early education that is not negligible. Haveman 
and Wolfe (1995) show that the monetary cost of mothers' day care time accounts for 18 percent 
of total parental investment in early education. 
16
                                                 
13 See Shonkoff and Phillips (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Currie and Blau (2006), Knudsen et al. (2006) 
and Schweinhart et al. (2005). 
 Landry et al. (2003) argue that parent-child interactions 
help children to understand that others respond to their interests and needs. With that 
understanding, children are more likely to explore and learn in an active way. An active learning 
experience in early years provides a good foundation for later learning. Carneiro et al. (2007) 
find that noncognitive skills, such as perseverance, persistence, self-esteem and discipline are 
14 See Cunha et al (2005), Cunha and Heckman (2007), Abington and Blankenau (2011), Caucutt and Lochner 
(2011) and Blankenau and Youderian (2012). 
15 Such expenditure is used for day care and physical tools that help children to learn, for example, toys, games, 
books and software. 
16 See Landry et al. (2001), Landry et al. (1997), Ainsworth et al. (1978) and Bornstein and Tamis-LeMonda 
(1989). 
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important to academic achievements and economic success.17
Given the significant size and effect of parental time, I include time investment as an 
education input in this paper. As in Caucutt and Lochner (2011), human capital development is 
modeled as a multi-stage process. Children receive private and public education expenditures in 
both early and late childhood, while they receive time investment from parents only in early 
childhood. Parents not only choose income allocation between education investment and 
consumption, they also decide how much time to invest in young children. The cost of time 
investment has two parts. First, parents forgo income by working less. Second, parents 
accumulate less work experience which reduces future wages. By including the parental time 
allocation choice, I am able to explore how early education policy affects human capital and 
labor supply. 
 Empirical work shows that non-
parental care is associated with children's vocabulary and behavior problems (see Belsky et al. 
(2007)). This result is consistent with the positive influences parents may have on children's 
noncognitive skills. Experience with parents builds a foundation for children to foster trust and 
a sense of security as well as to teach them effective ways to communicate and draw attention 
(see Grusec and Goodnow (1994)). 
In my model, only parents with children in early childhood choose time allocation, while 
parents with older children provide one unit of inelastic labor supply. I choose this specification 
for two reasons. First, empirical evidence demonstrates that the presence of preschool children 
has a substantially larger impact on parental work time than the presence of older children.18
The interaction between time investment and education expenditure determines variance 
in labor supply across individuals. Parental time can be substituted by education spending to 
some degree. For example, working parents can send children to day care or hire an in-home 
nanny. In addition, parents can invest in devices such as tablet computers that can read a book 
or play interactive games with children. Some of the traditional home teaching by parents can 
be replaced by physical tools. Due to this substitutability, the model shows that higher wage 
 
Second, parental involvement in early years is found to be most influential to children's 
learning. 
                                                 
17 Related studies include Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Mobius and Rosenblat (2005), Waddell (2006) and 
Borghans et al. (2006). 
18 See Kalenkoski et al. (2005) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008). 
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earners work more and spend more on education to compensate for lower time investment. This 
negative relationship between wages and day care time is also found in empirical studies.19
Compared to European countries, the US government is less involved in children's early 
education. This is shown through less public spending on early education. European 
governments pay 70 to 90 percent of the total cost of early education, while US governments 
pay 40 percent of the total cost (see Witte and Trowbridge (2005)). The low public funding in 
the U.S. is also shown by the coverage of early education programs. For example, the Head 
Start program was designed to prepare children from disadvantaged families to read and 
succeed in school. However, less than 40 percent of eligible families receive services from the 
Head Start due to limited government budget. Other than generous spending, European 
countries also provide paid parental leave to encourage parents to devote more time to their 
newborn children. Mothers in Europe are entitled to 14 to 20 weeks of maternity leave with 70 
to 100 percent pay (see Rossin-Slater et al. (2011)). In contrast, the US does not provide 
nationwide paid leave. Most states only offer unpaid maternity leave of 12 weeks.
   
20
This paper investigates the impact of adopting European-style early education policies 
would have on human capital and labor supply across income groups. First, I consider an 
increment in government expenditures on early education. In the United States, government 
spending on early education accounts for 0.04 percent of GDP. Adjusted for the lengths of early 
and late childhood, the corresponding government spending in late childhood is 0.14 percent of 
GDP. I run counterfactual experiments by allowing the government to fund early education at 
the same level as late education. This leads to an increment in government expenditures 
equivalent to 0.1 percent of GDP. In the first two experiments, the government allocates 
increased public resources to respectively direct government spending and subsidizing private 
spending. Second, I introduce paid parental leave to the economy. The percentage of wages 
replaced during parental leave is chosen at a level such that the policy is funded by 0.1 percent 
of GDP. Therefore, my analysis provides comparable macroeconomic effects across policy 
experiments. I show that increasing direct government spending is least effective at increasing 
human capital. This is because increased government spending crowds out private spending, 
especially for wealthy families. Consequently, there is no sizable increase in total spending as 
 
                                                 
19 See Friedberg and Webb (2005) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987). 
20 California, New Jersey and Washington have introduced partially paid maternity leave of 5 to 6 weeks. 
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intended and thus the policy does not produce higher human capital. Subsidizing private 
spending and adopting paid parental leave have significantly larger effects on human capital. 
This is achieved because these two policies substantially increase education expenditures and 
parental time investment, respectively. 
Labor supply, on average, increases modestly in response to both more direct public 
spending and the private spending subsidy. The key to this result is the substitutability between 
physical and time investment. Both policies bring up total education spending. Higher education 
spending crowds out parental time which leads to higher labor supply. This prediction is 
confirmed by empirical work from Canada. In 1997, the Quebec government initiated a policy 
to subsidize day care by 5 dollars per day per child. Researchers show that this policy has 
significantly positive effects on both labor force participation and work weeks (see Lefebvre 
and Merrigan (2008) and Baker et al. (2008)). In contrast, paid parental leave as intended 
decreases labor supply substantially.21
Moreover, I show that low wage earners are most responsive to paid leave due to a 
lower opportunity cost of missing work. Rossin-Slater et al. (2011) examine the adoption of 
paid maternity leave in California and show the same pattern. They find that the California 
program has doubled overall maternity leave use with the largest increase among less 
advantaged women.
 
22
My work is related to the study by Nordblom (2003). She introduces "within-the-family 
education" (WFE) as direct parental investment. Such investment includes both parental time 
and effort as well as monetary investments. Examples of WFE would include teaching children 
manners, disciplining them, helping them on homework or the purchase of computers and 
software. Nordblom argues that parental investment is complementary to public spending and 
more public spending helps children with better educated parents more. As a result, further 
investment in public schooling may widen the educational inequality. I include parental 
investment in a different way by separating time investment and physical investment. As in 
Nordblom (2003), in my model parenting is more effective when parents have higher human 
capital. However, parenting is also more costly to wealthy parents. I capture this feature and 
 
                                                 
21 Emprical evidence of this result includes Baker and Milligan (2008), Burgess et al. (2008) Dustmann and 
Schonberg (2008) and Carneiro et al. (2010). 
22 Carneiro et al. (2010) show similar results using data from Norway. 
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treat parental time as a substitute with parental spending. While Nordblom does not distinguish 
education in different periods, I treat human capital formation as a multi-stage process and 
focus on education in the early stage. 
This study is related to Abington and Blankenau (2011) who also model human capital 
in a hierarchical fashion. They explore the effects of different government funding structures on 
human capital, given the crucial role of early education. My work departs from theirs by 
including parental time allocation choice. Moreover, I evaluate paid parental leave policy and 
provide a comparative analysis. 
 2 Model 
I develop an overlapping generations model where agents live five periods. In each 
period, new agents are born into early childhood. In the subsequent period, agents are in late 
childhood. Throughout the first two periods of life, agents do not make economic decisions. 
They receive human capital investments from parents and the government. After accumulating 
human capital, agents enter early adulthood in the third period. In this period, they also have 
children in early childhood. As parents and workers, agents allocate time and income as 
specified below. The fourth period of life is spent in late adulthood where agents face a different 
set of allocation decisions and their offspring are in late childhood. Agents become empty 
nesters in the last period where their children enter adulthood as workers and parents. 
The economy is formed by 2N dynasties. Given any time period t, N dynasties have 
children in early childhood, agents in early parenthood and agents in the last period of life. 
While the other N dynasties have children in late childhood and parents in late parenthood. 
Income tax is collected from 3N working agents to fund education for N children in early 
childhood and N children in late childhood. 
 2.1 Formation of human capital 
Agents entering childhood have heterogeneous innate ability. I assume that through 
nature and nurture, children perfectly inherit innate ability from parents. The innate ability 
parameter 𝑎𝑖 measures the productivity of children in dynasty i of transforming physical 
investment, such as day care and schooling, into human capital. With different 𝑎𝑖 and private 
education investments, agents enter adulthood with heterogeneous human capital. 
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For simplicity I remove subscript i indicative of dynasty, taking it as given that the 
innate ability parameter a and all endogenous variables pertain to a dynasty. In addition, I avoid 
subscript t indicative of the time period. Rather, variables with notation �  refer to the 
generations in childhood and the ones without �  refer to the parents. 
An agent's human capital, ℎ�, is accumulated as follows 
ℎ� = �(𝑎𝑒)𝜃 + (ℎ𝑡)𝜃�𝜈𝜃. (2.1) 
Here human capital is a function of a physical investment component, ae, and a time 
investment component, ht. The first component has two parts, innate ability, a, and a measure of 
education expenditures, e. As stated earlier, a is a productivity measure for transferring 
education expenditures into human capital and e is a measure of the education expenditures 
devoted by both parents and the government. The second component also has two parts, 
parental human capital, h, and parental time investments in early education, t. Active parenting 
in early years helps to develop children's learning ability, so time spent with young children, t, 
contributes to their human capital, h. Lefebvre and Merrigan (1998) use data from Canada and 
show the positive effect of parental human capital on children's cognitive development. They 
argue that this may be the result of quality parent-children interaction, such as frequency of 
reading and efficient parenting. This argument is supported by Behrman et al. (1999) based on 
data from rural India. Their estimates suggest that maternal schooling increases the productivity 
of home teaching, and thus increases the schooling of next generation. Accordingly, I allow 
parents with more human capital h to be more effective in nurturing the offspring. The 
parameter 𝜃 ≤ 1 governs the substitutability between physical and time investments. When the 
parameter 𝜃 = 0, the production function is reduced to a Cobb-Douglas function and the 
elasticity of substitution equals 1. The parameter 𝜈 ∈ (0, 1) governs the curvature of the 
function. With 𝜈 < 1, the human capital production function exhibits diminishing returns. 
The measure of education expenditures is formed in a hierarchical fashion. As in 
Blankenau and Youderian (2011) and Cunha and Heckman (2008), I define 
𝑒 = (𝛾𝑖𝑒 𝛷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑖𝑙𝛷)1𝛷 (2.2) 
where 𝑖𝑒 and 𝑖𝑙 are education investment in early and late childhood. The measure of education 
expenditures, e, is formed by 𝑖𝑒 and 𝑖𝑙 in a c.e.s production function, where 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1) gauges 
the weight of investment on early education and Φ ≤ 1 gauges the substitutability between 
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early and late investment. When 𝛷 ∈ (0, 1], the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1. I refer to 
this as early and late investments being substitutes. When 𝛷 < 0, the elasticity of substitution is 
smaller than 1. I refer to this as early and late investments being complements. 
Education investment in each period of childhood depends on parental and government 
expenditures on education. I specify 
𝑖𝑒 = �𝑓𝑒𝜂 + 𝑔𝑒𝜂�1𝜂 , 𝑖𝑙 = �𝑓𝑙𝜂 + 𝑔𝑙𝜂�1𝜂 (2.3) 
where 𝑓𝑒 and 𝑔𝑒 are private and public spending on early childhood education, and 𝑓𝑙 and 𝑔𝑙 are 
private and public spending on late childhood education. The parameter 𝜂 ≤ 1 governs the 
degree of substitutability between private and public spending. This specification is similar to 
that in Restuccai and Urrutia (2004) and Arcalean and Schiopu (2008). 
 2.2 Labor market outcome 
Worker productivity in this economy depends on accumulated human capital and labor 
market work experience. More specifically, the wage is determined as follows 
𝑤𝑗 = ℎ𝑒𝛼𝑥𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ (1,2,3). (2.4) 
I use j to indicate the number of periods an agent has been an adult. So 𝑤₁,𝑤₂, and 𝑤₃ 
are respectively the wages agents face when they are young parents, old parents and empty 
nesters. Wages depend on an agent's human capital, h, and accumulated work experience, 𝑥𝑗 . 
The experience parameter α ≥0 corresponds to the coefficient before the work experience 
variable in the Mincer wage equation. A higher α indicates that work experience is more 
valuable for labor productivity. As an agent enters early parenthood, work experience is 𝑥₁ = 0, 
and thus 𝑤₁ = ℎ. During early parenthood, the agent is endowed with one unit of time and 
chooses time allocation between work and children. Given the time spent with young children t, 
the agent's work experience accumulated during early adulthood is 𝑥₂ = 1 − 𝑡. As a result, 
𝑤₂ = ℎ𝑒𝛼(1−𝑡). The labor supply is inelastic when the agent is in late adulthood, hence the 
accumulated work experience is 𝑥₃ = 2 − 𝑡 when one becomes an empty nester and keeps 
working. So the wage in the last period of life is 𝑤₃ = ℎ𝑒𝛼(2−𝑡). 
 2.3 The agent's problem 
Children are passive economic agents. Parents are endowed with one unit of time in 
each period of adulthood. They choose time allocation between work and time spent with 
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children in early parenthood, consumption through adulthood and education spending in their 
offspring's early and late childhood in order to maximize 
�𝛽𝑗−1
𝑐𝑗
𝜎
𝜎
+ 𝜉 ℎ�𝜎
𝜎
.3
𝑗=1
  (2.5) 
Here 𝑐𝑗 denotes consumption in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  period of an agent's adulthood and 𝛽 < 1 
discounts future consumption. Utility also depends on the human capital of an agent's offspring, h�.23
∑
𝑐𝑗
𝑟𝑗−1
3
𝑗=1 + 𝑓𝑒 + 𝑓𝑙𝑟 = �𝑤1(1 − 𝑡) + 𝑤2𝑟 + 𝑤3𝑟2� (1 − 𝜏), 
 The term ξ scales the importance of child's human capital and σ gauges marginal utility of 
𝑐𝑗 and h�. The utility function exhibits log preferences when 𝜎 = 0. An agent's choice of time 
allocation and education spending on children affects h� through equations (2.1)-(2.3). Time 
investments in children's early education, t, incurs the cost of wages forgone in the current 
period. In addition, a lower labor supply in early adulthood results in lower wages in the 
subsequent two periods through less work experience. Defining r to be the interest rate and τ to 
be the income tax rate, the agent's budget constraints can be written as 
(2.6) 
𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑐3 ≥ 0,  
𝑓𝑒 ,𝑓𝑙 ≥ 0,  
𝑡 ∈ [0, 1].  
 2.4 Government 
In any given period, the aggregate income of agents in early parenthood across N 
dynasties is ∑𝑤₁(1 − 𝑡).  The aggregate income of agents in following two stages of life are 
∑𝑤₂ and ∑𝑤₃, respectively. Using the simplified notation again, I specify total output Y as 
𝑌 = ∑(𝑤1(1 − 𝑡) + 𝑤2 + 𝑤3). (2.7) 
Government taxes labor income with a common tax rate τ to fund early and late 
childhood education. In the baseline model, government supports education directly through 
government expenditure. Defining G as total government spending, the budget relationship is 
∑𝑔𝑒 + ∑𝑔𝑙 = 𝜏𝑌 = 𝐺. (2.8) 
This study focuses on government policies regarding early childhood education, thus I 
define 
                                                 
23 See Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and Behrman et al. (1995) for similar specification of utility function. 
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𝜍𝑒  = ∑𝑔𝑒𝑌  (2.9) 
𝜍𝑙  = ∑𝑔𝑙𝑌   
where 𝜍𝑒 , 𝜍𝑙 ∈ [0, 1] are respectively the share of output allocated to government spending on 
early and late childhood education. 
 2.5 Equilibrium 
The analysis focuses on steady state equilibria of the model. At such a steady state, 
individual decision rules solve the utility maximization problem and the government balances 
the budget. Decision rules and economic outcomes within each dynasty are time-invariant after 
convergence. A detailed definition of equilibrium with complete subscripts is presented in the 
appendix 1. 
 3 Calibration 
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Many parameters can be obtained without 
solving the model. I calibrate these parameters to their empirical counterparts. The remaining 
parameters are estimated to match several aggregate statistics. Table 2-1 summarizes the values 
of directly calibrated parameters. 
Innate ability is exogenous and time-invariant for each dynasty. In the initial period, I 
assign a random draw from a log normal distribution to each dynasty as the ability parameter, a. 
The first two parameters in Table 2-1 capture the main features of the distribution. I normalize 
the mean and standard deviation to 1, 𝑎 = 𝜎𝑎 = 1. 
The next parameter, θ, governs the degree of substitutability between physical and time 
investment. Herbst (2010) uses CPS and SIPP data between 1990 and 2004 to study the wage 
effects on the time allocation of single mothers. He finds that mothers with higher wages work 
more after controlling for the price of day care. I argue that this finding is supportive of the 
relative substitutability between education expenses and time investment. When parental time is 
substitutable, higher wage earners work more and with more income, they spend more to 
compensate for less time investment. However, I exclude the extreme case of perfect 
substitutability, since attention from parents is necessary for children to develop emotional and 
social skills. Therefore, I choose 𝜽 = 0.5 for the benchmark economy.  
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    Table 2-1. Parameters set exogenously 
Description Parameters Values 
Mean of innate ability a 1 
Standard deviation of innate ability 𝜎𝑎 1 
Substitutability parameter of physical and time investment θ 0.500 
Substitutability parameter of private and public expenditures η 0.950 
Weight on early education γ 0.750 
Discount rate β 0.815 
Intertemporal preference parameter σ 0 
Interest rate r 1.056 
Experience parameter α 0.054 
% of GDP on early childhood education by government 𝜍𝑒 0.004 
% of GDP on late childhood education by government 𝜍𝑙 0.014 
 
The parameter η measures the substitutability between private and public spending. 
Since the source of education expenditure does not affect its productivity, I treat private and 
public spending as highly substitutable by setting 𝜂 = 0.95. This assumption is common in the 
literature.24 I consider a less substitutable case in the sensitivity check by setting 𝜂 = 0.5. 
Studies on early childhood intervention suggest that the skills that affect schooling and labor 
market outcomes are shaped in early years.25
I take the commonly used annual discount rate of 0.96 and compute the corresponding 
discount rate 𝛽 = 0.815. Empirical estimates for the other preference parameter, σ, are available 
 Their finding reflects the relative importance of 
investing early in children's education. Cunha et al. (2005) summarize the main findings in the 
human capital literature and reach a similar conclusion. They find the return to investments in 
early childhood is high while the return to investments in late childhood and beyond is low. 
Blankenau and Youderian (2012) calibrate a similar model of human capital and their estimate 
of the weight of early education is 0.475. In their paper, late childhood lasts three times long as 
early childhood. Adjusted for the relative lengths of early and late childhood in this paper, the 
corresponding value 𝛾 is 0.75. Accordingly, I set 𝛾 = 0.75 in the benchmark economy and 
consider a lower bound of 𝛾 as 0.65 in the sensitivity check. 
                                                 
24 See Becker and Tomes (1986), Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) and Abington and Blankenau (2011). 
25 See Shonkoff and Phillips(2000) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003). 
44 
 
and they range from -2 to -0.5 in the literature.26
Next I consider the variables that capture the economic environment. Holter (2011) 
calculates the average 3-month T-bill rates minus inflation during period 1947-2008. I take it as 
the annual interest rate and set 𝑟 = 1.056 accordingly. The experience parameter α can be 
interpreted as the wage increase, on a percentage basis, due to additional working experience of 
five years. I adopt Heckman et al. (2006)'s estimates on the Mincer earnings regression and 
derive the value of α in the context of this model. 
 For simplicity, I choose 𝜎 = 0 which is 
consistent with log preferences. 
The policy parameters are 𝜍𝑒 and 𝜍𝑙, which represent the share of GDP allocated by the 
government to early and late education, respectively. Heymann et al. (2004) show that the 
United States spends 0.4 percent of total output in childhood. Based on their finding, I set 
𝜍𝑒=0.004. Education at a Glance (2007) reports that total public spending on primary, lower 
secondary and upper secondary education accounts for 3.6 percent of GDP. As a modeling 
choice in this study, late childhood is symmetric to early childhood in length. Given that late 
childhood takes 5 years, I compute the corresponding GDP share allocated to that period and 
choose 𝜍𝑙 =0.014. 
I calibrate the remaining parameters simultaneously so that the model generates an 
economy similar to the U.S. economy, regarding income inequality and parental participation in 
education investment. Table 2-2 displays the parameters and their targets. As shown in the 
fourth column of Table 2-2, I target the Gini index and the share of private spending in early 
and late education. The model is able to generate data that precisely matches these statistical 
targets. 
    Table 2-2. Parameters set endogenously 
Description  Value Target Data 
Curvature parameter ν 0.606 Gini index 0.470 
Discount rate on children's human capital ξ 0.177 𝑓𝑒/(𝑓𝑒 + 𝑔𝑒) 0.600 
Substitutability between early and late edu. Φ -0.201 𝑓𝑙/(𝑓𝑙 + 𝑔𝑙) 0.086 
 
Notice that the substitutability parameter Φ is negative, indicating that early investment 
is complementary to later investment. Caucutt and Lochner (2011) and Cunha et al. (2010) use 
different estimation and calibration strategies to examine the complementarity/substitutability 
                                                 
26 See Keane and Wolpin (2001), Beaudry and Wincoopn (1996) and Hubbard et al. (1994). 
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between investments across periods. They agree that investments in different periods of 
childhood are complements. Heckman (2006) explains this complementarity using evidence 
from child development studies. He argues that acquired skills and abilities in early years 
motivate children to learn more and make later learning more efficient.27
    4 Policy experiments 
 Blankenau and 
Youderian (2012) calibrate this parameter in a similar human capital accumulation model and 
set Φ = -1.8. I choose a more complementary case in the sensitivity check by setting Φ = -0.8. 
 4.1 Current policy 
In this section, I examine the economic outcomes in the benchmark economy where 
government spending on early and late education is 0.4 and 1.4 percent of GDP, respectively. 
For comparison purposes, I divide the population by income tercile (low, medium, high) and 
compute mean innate ability, a, accumulated human capital, h, life-time income, 𝑤₁(1 − 𝑡) +
𝑤₂
𝑟
+ 𝑤₃
𝑟² , labor supply in the first working period, 1-t, the share of total income spent on early 
education, 𝑓𝑒
𝑤₁(1−𝑡)+𝑤₂
𝑟
+
𝑤₃
𝑟²  and the share of total income spent on on later education, 
𝑓𝑙
𝑤₁(1−𝑡)+𝑤₂
𝑟
+
𝑤₃
𝑟²   for each income group. Table 2-3 presents the results. Innate ability, human 
capital and income are normalized by the average value in the lowest-income group. 
    Table 2-3. The benchmark economy by earnings tercile 
 Low Medium High 
Innate ability 1 2.772 9.434 
Private spending in early childhood 0.005 0.014 0.022 
Private spending in late childhood 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Labor supply in early adulthood 0.945 0.965 0.982 
Human capital 1 1.973 6.485 
Income 1 1.981 6.574 
 
Innate ability is exogenously determined, more specifically, it is randomly drawn from a 
log normal distribution. In this model, variance in ability is the root of variance in parental 
decisions and economic outcomes across agents. The second and third rows of Table 2-3 show 
that private spending on education increases progressively with family income. The lowest-
                                                 
27 Related studies include Cameron (2004) and Knudsen et al. (2006). 
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income group spends almost nothing on children's education. While the highest-income group, 
on average, allocates 2.6 percent of total income to education. Parents spend more on early 
education than on later education. This is because government spending on later education is 
higher, resulting in a lower marginal return to private spending in this stage. 
The labor supply of wealthier agents is higher than that of less wealthy agents. On 
average, a parent in the high-income group works 4 percent more than a parent in the low-
income group. This is because higher wage earners incur a higher opportunity cost of taking 
time off for child care, so they work more. Part of this extra income is allocated to education to 
compensate for a lower time investment by parents. This pattern is found in many empirical 
studies on working mothers.28
A higher level of private spending on both early and late education by wealthier families 
generates a higher level of human capital and income for their children. This is shown in the last 
two rows in Table 2-3. However, the income gap between the poor and rich is smaller than the 
ability gap. This is because parents in the low-income group spend more time with children and 
that counteracts the low level of physical investment. 
 
 4.2 Increasing government spending 
Compared to other OECD countries, the U.S. government spends a smaller share of 
GDP on early education. To investigate the policy effects of more public spending in this area, I 
consider increasing government expenditures in early childhood from 0.4 to 1.4 percent of 
GDP. In this case, the government allocates the same amount of public resources to early and 
late education, and the policy parameter setting becomes 𝜍𝑒 = 𝜍𝑙 = 0.014. Figure 1 shows the 
impact of this policy on average human capital, labor supply and income for each earnings 
tercile. All measures are presented relative to their counterparts in the benchmark economy. For 
example, the very first bar indicates that on average, human capital is 32 percent higher for low 
wage earners when 𝜍𝑒 = 0.014 relative to 𝜍𝑒 = 0.004. 
Notice that human capital increases noticeably for both low- and medium-income 
groups, while the change in human capital for the high-income group is miniscule. This result 
can be explained by the crowding out effect of government spending. Since public and private 
spending are very substitutable, when government spends more on early education, parents 
                                                 
28 See Hetherington et al. (1983), Haveman et al. (1991) and Freidberg and Webb (2005). 
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spend less and allocate more resources to consumption and late education. This crowding out 
effect varies with family income. In the benchmark economy, poor families spend almost 
nothing on children's early education, so there is not much room to crowd out private spending.  
In contrast, rich families spend a fair share of total income in early childhood, and hence, more 
government spending reduces parental spending by a larger amount for them. A given 
increment of government spending results in a larger increase in total spending for the poor, 
which results in a larger increase in human capital. 
 
Figure 2-1. Policy effects of increasing government spending 
In terms of labor supply, the low-income group is the most responsive to increased 
government spending. An increase in government spending affects labor supply through two 
channels. First, more government spending increases total physical investment in education, 
which crowds out time investment and leads to an increase in labor supply. Second, a higher 
level of government spending is accompanied by a higher income tax rate, which causes labor 
supply to drop. For the low-income group, the measure of education expenditures, e, doubles. 
Therefore, the first effect dominates the second effect and poor families work more. While for 
the high-income group, the second effect dominates, since the same increase in tax rate 
corresponds to a larger amount of income loss for them. As a result, parents in the highest 
earnings tercile work less in response to an increase in 𝜍𝑒 . 
Combining the effects on human capital and labor supply, it is easy to understand why 
income grows most, on a percentage basis, for the lower-income agents. This result is shown by 
the third bar for each income group. 
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 4.3 Subsidizing parental spending 
Due to the crowding out effect of direct government spending, parents spend less on 
early education. The same public resources can be allocated to early education by subsidizing 
parental spending, in which case parents are encouraged to spend more. In this experiment, I 
consider a government subsidy on private spending in early childhood. With a subsidy rate 𝑠𝑓 ∈ [0, 1], government provides a subsidy of 𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑒 to parents to spend on early education. So 
equations (2.3) can be rewritten as 
𝑖𝑒 = �𝛼(�1 + 𝑠𝑓�𝑓𝑒�𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑒𝜂)1𝜂  , 𝑖𝑙 = (𝑎𝑓𝑙𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑙𝜂)1𝜂    (2.10) 
and the budget relationship becomes 
�𝑔𝑒 + �𝑔𝑙 + 𝑠𝑓�𝑓𝑒 = 𝜏𝑌 = 𝐺.     
I define 
𝜍𝑓 = 𝑠𝑓 ∑ 𝑓𝑒𝑌 .  
Here policy parameter 𝜍𝑓 is the share of total output allocated to subsidize private spending. 
With a given subsidy rate, 𝑠𝑓, there is a corresponding tax rate τ that balances the government 
budget. In the previous experiment, the tax rate is increased to 0.028 in order to fund the 
increase in government expenditures on early education. In order to generate comparable policy 
effects, I set 𝑠𝑓 = 0.375 in this experiment to match 𝜏 = 0.028. The policy parameter setting 
becomes 𝜍𝑒 = 0.004, 𝜍𝑙 = 0.014, 𝑠𝑓 = 0.375. Figure 2 shows the average human capital, labor 
supply and income in each income group. Again, the values are relative to their counterparts in 
the benchmark economy. 
Human capital increases substantially for all agents and the effect increases with family 
income. Private spending is subsidized which is equivalent to an increase in the marginal return 
to private spending. So all parents spend more in early childhood which further increases the 
total spending on early education. Due to the high degree of complementarity between early and 
later education, parents also allocate more resources in late childhood. As a result, the measure 
of education expenditures, e, increases by 53, 58 and 61 percent respectively for the low-, 
medium- and high-income group. The government subsidy is proportional to private spending. 
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Figure 2-2. Policy effects of subsidizing private spending 
 
With considerably more private spending, wealthy families receive more subsidy than less 
wealthy families. Consequently, the high-income group benefits from the policy with most 
increase in total education spending which leads to most increase in human capital. 
The policy affects labor supply through the same channels as discussed earlier. Without 
the crowding out effect, wealthy families also observe a large increase in physical investment in 
education which crowds out time investment. So the positive effect on labor supply is 
strengthened for the wealthy and it leads to an increase of labor supply. 
The percentage change in income is positively related to family income, as shown by the 
bars of income in Figure 2. 
 4.4 Paid parental leave 
As a part of early childhood education and care policy, paid parental leave is available in 
many European countries. In general, European countries have more generous parental leave 
programs than the U.S.. New parents in the U.S. are entitled to take 12 weeks of unpaid job-
protected parental leave, while some European countries provide up to 26 weeks of paid 
parental leave. In this experiment, I explore the impact of a paid parental leave program, where 
parents are compensated by the government when they take time off for child care. The 
compensation is proportional to parents' earnings lost by not working. I let 𝑠𝑡 ∈ [0, 1] to be the 
percentage of forgone income subsidized by the government. The subsidy for young parents is 
𝑤1𝑡𝑠𝑡. Agents' budget constraints become 
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+ 𝑓𝑒 + 𝑓𝑙𝑟 = �𝑤1(1 − 𝑡) + 𝑤1𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝑤2𝑟 + 𝑤3𝑟2� (1 − 𝜏) 
and the government budget relationship is 
�𝑔𝑒 + �𝑔𝑙 + 𝑠𝑡�𝑤1𝑡 = 𝜏𝑌 = 𝐺.    
To facilitate the investigation on the change in taxation, I define 
𝜍𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡∑𝑤₁𝑡𝑌  
where 𝜍𝑡 is the share of total output spent by the government on paid parental leave. Any given 
𝑠𝑡 is strictly mapped to a τ that balances the government budget. Again, I choose the value of 𝑠𝑡 
to target 𝜏 = 0.028 so that government reallocates the same share of GDP to this program as it 
does in the previous experiments. I find that when stay at home parents receive 31.8 percent of 
the earnings forgone, the tax rate is increased to 0.024. The policy parameter setting in this 
experiment is 𝜍𝑒 = 0.004, 𝜍𝑙 = 0.014, 𝑠𝑓 = 0.493. Figure 3 shows the results. 
Compared to the previous policies, parental leave is targeting time investment rather 
than physical investment in early education. By providing incentives to parents to spend more 
time with young children, the paid parental leave policy generates higher human capital for all 
families. As depicted in Figure 3, the greatest change in human capital occurs to the least 
wealthy families. This is because poor parents are most responsive to the policy by working less 
and investing more time in early childhood. More specifically, the labor supply decreases by 7.6 
percent for the low-income group, while it decreases by 3.4 percent for the high-income group. 
 
Figure 2-3. Policy effects of paid parental leave 
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The cost of taking time off from the labor market has two parts. First, parents endure the 
earnings forgone in the current period by not working. Second, parents lose some future 
earnings due to less working experience accumulated. A parental leave program helps young 
parents to cover some of the direct cost but not the indirect cost due to less experience. The cost 
of forgone experience is higher for wealthy parents since they obtain high human capital. This 
explains why they are not as responsive as less wealthy parents to the parental leave program. 
This is in the line with empirical findings by Rossin-Slater et al. (2011). They study the first 
paid family leave program in the United States using data from California.29
The change in income exhibits the same pattern as the change in human capital. Lower-
income families end up with a greater increase in total income than higher-income families. The 
increment in human capital is not fully transmitted to extra income, because agents work less in 
response to the policy. 
 Their estimates 
show that the overall use of maternity leave increased from 3 to 4 weeks to 6 to 7 weeks. 
Moreover, the effect is most significant among less-educated, unmarried and black mothers. 
 4.5 Aggregate effects 
In this section, I compare the aggregate effects of the three policies. For each 
experiment, I compute the average human capital, labor supply and utility of the population. 
Total output and the Gini index are also calculated to show the effects on aggregate income and 
income inequality. Table 2-4 shows the results. In the first through fourth rows, all measures are 
normalized to the benchmark economy. 
   Table 2-4. Aggregate effects of policy experiments 
 Benchmark Increasing 𝜍𝑒 
 
Subsidizing 𝑓𝑒 
 
Paid parental 
 Human capital 1 1.062 1.269 1.272 
Labor supply 1 1.004 1.004 0.945 
Total output 1 1.062 1.270 1.266 
Utility 1 1.151 1.208 1.421 
Gini index 0.470 0.425 0.488 0.401 
 
                                                 
29 The paid family leave program in California took place in 2004. Parents of new born children are entitled to a 
partially paid leave 6 weeks. Wage replacement rate is 55% with a weekly wage ceilling of $959. 
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Comparing the average human capital across columns, It appears that increasing 
government expenditures is least effective at increasing human capital. This is due to the 
crowding out effect of public spending. Subsidizing private spending and introducing paid 
parental leave increase the average human capital by 26.9 and 27.2 percent, respectively. The 
former policy increases physical investment in early education by providing incentives to 
parents to spend more. While the latter policy increases parental time investment by 
incentivizing parents to work less. 
Labor supply is not very responsive to the first two policies, as shown in the second row. 
This is because both experiments affect labor supply indirectly through higher education 
expenditures and a higher tax rate. Through these two channels, economic forces create positive 
and negative effects on labor supply, so the change in labor supply depends on the relative sizes 
of the two forces. In contrast, the paid parental leave program provides incentives to young 
parents to work less and that directly affects labor supply. On average, young parents work 5.5 
percent less paid parental leave is available. 
Notice the change in total output is similar to the change in human capital. Labor supply 
drops when the paid parental leave is introduced and that makes total output grow less than 
human capital in the last experiment. The fourth row shows the change in utility for all policy 
experiments. This is measured by the equivalent variation. For example, increasing government 
expenditures on early education increases average utility. The change in utility is equivalent to a 
10 percent increase in consumption in all periods. The average utility increases across columns, 
while the paid parental leave policy generates the largest effect. This is because the policy 
produces the largest increase in human capital which is valued by parents. 
The last row shows the change in income inequality measured by the Gini index. 
Increasing government spending on early education brings down the Gini index to 0.425. As 
discussed earlier, the smaller crowding out effect among the poor leads to a larger increase in 
total education spending for them, and hence they see a larger increase in human capital and 
income than the rich. As a result, income inequality is reduced. Subsidizing private spending on 
early education has the opposite effect on the Gini index which increases to 0.488. Since rich 
parents spend more on early education than poor parents, a proportional subsidy policy results 
in the largest increase in total education spending for rich parents. Consequently, they also 
experience the largest increase in human capital and income which strengthens the income 
inequality. Paid parental leave is most effective at reducing the Gini index as it drops to 0.401 in 
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the last experiment. This is due to the fact that low-income families are more responsive to the 
policy. They allocate substantially more time with young children and that contributes to a 
larger increase in human capital and subsequently income. 
 4.6 Sensitivity check 
I consider alternative values of a few parameters in this section. Table 2-5 shows the 
values of these parameters in sensitivity analysis and the benchmark economy (in parenthesis) 
as well as the corresponding policy effects.  
    Table 2-5. Sensitivity check 
 Benchmark Increasing 𝜍𝑒 
 
Subsidizing 𝑓𝑒 
 
Paid parental 
 𝛾 = 0.65 (0.75):     
Total output 1 1.066 1.228 1.285 
Gini index 0.458 0.413 0.476 0.386 
𝜂 = 0.5 (0.95):      
Total output 1 1.300 1.119 1.210 
Gini index 0.463 0.436 0.471 0.417 
 𝛷 = -0.8 (-0.2)     
Total output 1 1.058 1.235 1.275 
Gini index 0.461 0.419 0.477 0.392 
  
The relative importance of early education, 𝛾, and the degree of complementarity 
between early and late childhood education, 𝛷 seem to have modest impact on the relative 
effects of the three policies. It is shown again that subsidizing private spending and paid 
parental leave are much more effective at increasing GDP than a direct increase in public 
spending. However, subsidizing private spending causes more income inequality while paid 
parental leave reduces the Gini index. 
When public and private spending are less substitutable, 𝜂 = 0.5, increasing government 
spending becomes more effective than the other two policies. This is not surprising because the 
crowding out effect is smaller when private spending is less substitutable by government 
spending. The smaller crowding out effect results in larger increase in total spending, and 
consequently larger increase in human capital and output.  
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 5 Conclusion 
Parent-child interactions are considered to be vital in early childhood, as it is during this 
period that important cognitive and social skills develop. Quality interactions with parents 
improve children's focus, foster trust and build a foundation for intellectual curiosity and active 
learning. This paper contributes to the literature by including parental time investment as an 
education input in early childhood. My purpose is to explore the effects of different expenditure 
policies and paid parental leave on human capital, labor supply and income inequality. I build 
an overlapping generations model where human capital is formed in early and late childhood. 
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy so that the generated data matches parental 
participation in education expenditures and the Gini index. With the parameter setting in the 
benchmark economy, I run counterfactual experiments and evaluate different policies in the 
general equilibrium. 
I show that increasing government spending is least effective at increasing human 
capital. This is because public spending crowds out private spending and thus total spending 
increases less than intended. In addition, the reduction of private spending is larger for wealthier 
families since they spend relatively more and there is more room for crowding out. This also 
explains why the income gap between the poor and rich narrows, as shown by a lower Gini 
index. Subsidizing private spending instead, motives parents to spend more. The increase in 
total spending is the largest in the high-income group since as they spend more privately, they 
receive more government subsidy. This contributes to increased income inequality as the Gini 
index rises to 0.488. Paid parental leave induces the largest increase in human capital by 
increasing parental time investment. This result implies the importance of parental-care to 
children's early development and later achievement. 
Paid family leave is designed to encourage more time allocation to parental-care. My 
model shows that adopting paid parental leave with a wage replacement rate of 49.3 percent, on 
average, reduces labor supply by 5.5 percent. The comparison analysis indicates that poor 
parents are most responsive and they work 7.6 percent less. This finding is supported by 
empirical studies, such as Rossin-Slater et al. (2011) and Carneiro et al. (2010). They use data 
from the U.S. and Norway, respectively. Both studies reach the conclusion that less advantaged 
mothers are more likely to take advantage of maternity leave if it includes wage compensation. 
The driving economic factor is the opportunity cost of parental-care. Higher-wage earners not 
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only bear a higher income loss, they also endure a higher cost of future wage cuts due to less 
work experience. Consequently, rich parents reduce labor supply by a smaller amount. Their 
smaller increase in time investment results in a smaller increase in human capital and income. 
This explains why paid parental leave is most effective in reducing income inequality indicated 
by a lower Gini index of 0.401. 
This paper considers parental time allocation choice as the only determinant of 
employment. However, demand forces in the labor market may also be affected by the adoption 
of paid parental leave. A promising extension of current research is a more comprehensive 
analysis that includes the responses of employers. I also abstract from fertility choices by 
assuming one child is born into each family. Incorporating endogenous fertility choices would 
create another interesting layer of policy analysis. 
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Chapter 3 - The motherhood wage penalty and non-working 
women: theory and evidence 
 1 Introduction 
It is well documented that mothers, on average, earn lower wages than women without 
children. The traditional human capital model (see Mincer and Polachek (1974)) offers three 
explanations for this wage gap. First, human capital stops growing when women take a break 
from the labor market due to childbearing and maternity leave. Second, human capital 
depreciates when women are off work. Third, women who expect to have children and focus 
more on within-family production invest less in human capital. However, after controlling for 
educational attainment, work experience and individual heterogeneity, the wage gap remains 
positive and significant.30
In the literature, this wage gap is also called the child/motherhood wage penalty and is 
obtained by regressing log wage on a dummy variable indicating motherhood status (i.e. 1-
mother; 0-not a mother). Productivity and demographic variables are also included in the 
regression to control for human capital and the labor market environment. The estimate of the 
motherhood variable is interpreted as the wage effect of having children. Researchers originally 
studied the wage effect of childbirth by focusing on employment breaks. Mincer and Polacheck 
(1974) use the 1967 National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) data and show that the child penalty 
due to work interruptions is not statistically significant. 
 
The cross-sectional estimates are biased if unobserved worker characteristics are 
correlated with both wages and motherhood variables. To address the heterogeneity problem, 
further work examines the child penalty using panel data.31
                                                 
30 See Budig and England (2001), Phipps et al. (2001) and Waldfogel (1998). 
 Waldfogel (1998) uses data from the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79) in the United States and National 
Development Survey in Britain. She adopts the fixed effects model to capture unobserved 
individual attributes such as perseverance and leadership skills. However, controlling for 
heterogeneity does not significantly change the size of the wage penalty in this study. Anderson 
31 See Baum (2002), Gupta and Smith (2002) and Walfogel (1997, 1995). 
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et al. (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) both use U.S. data but find that the 
child penalty is significantly reduced in the fixed effects model. 
In search of other causes of the child wage penalty, some researchers study mothers' job 
choices after childbirth and show that mothers' self-selection into family-compatible 
occupations partly explains the motherhood penalty.32
Most studies on the child penalty estimate the wage difference between employed 
mothers and non-mothers, excluding all non-working women due to the lack of wage data. 
However, if the observed wage difference is not representative of the wage gap between all 
mothers and non-mothers, analysis that excludes the non-working population may incur a 
selection problem and lead to biased estimates of the motherhood effect. To address the issue, I 
develop a simple model of fertility and work decisions to examine the relationships among 
fertility, employment and wages. The model implies that given the same non-labor income, all 
childless women face the same reservation wage and a childless woman chooses to work only 
when her wage exceeds that reservation wage. As a result, the working childless women are 
higher wage earners among all childless women. In contrast, the reservation wage of mothers 
depends on their motherhood preference. A mother with strong preference over child care faces 
a higher reservation wage. So a non-working mother may face a relatively high wage but 
chooses not to work due to her interest in child care. Excluding all non-working women is 
equivalent to selecting childless women with lower wages, mothers with lower wages and 
potentially mothers with higher wages out of the sample. Consequently, ignoring all non-
working women may result in an overestimated wage child penalty. 
 Beblo et al. (2009) use data on mothers 
and non-mothers in Germany to examine the pay gap between families with children and 
families without children. They find that the wage cut due to the first birth is reduced from 26 
percent to 19 percent after controlling for occupation-specific effects. Simonsen and Skipper 
(2006) use a 1997 cross-sectional subsample of Danish women in the 20-40 age bracket. 
Controlling for sector-specific effects and using matching estimators in the analysis, they find 
that the direct causal effect of motherhood on wages is small while the total effect is 
significantly negative. In addition, they suggest that mothers self-sort into the public sector due 
to time flexibility and large non-pecuniary benefits. Baum (2002) finds that the wage effect of 
work interruptions due to childbirth is reduced if mothers return to their pre-childbirth jobs. 
                                                 
32 See Nielsen et al. (2004) and Herry and Wolframz (2009). 
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To test the predictions of the model and examine the potential selection bias empirically, 
I use data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY97). I follow the 
literature and adopt both cross-sectional OLS and the fixed effects models to examine the child 
wage penalty. To account for heterogeneous human capital and selection into occupations, I 
control for educational attainment, work experience, and occupation in the wage equation. By 
doing so, I am able to isolate the contribution of each variable to the wage gap between mothers 
and non-mothers. In addition, the two-stage Heckman selection model is adopted to include 
non-working women and I find that the child wage penalty becomes small and insignificant. 
This finding supports the existence of selection bias implying that the child penalty is typically 
overstated. 
To my knowledge, there are few studies that address this selection problem. One 
exception is the work by Amudedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005). They first estimate a probit 
model of likelihood to work and then include the inverse Mill's ratio (λ) constructed from the 
probit model in the wage regression. To predict the likelihood of working, Amudedo-Dorantes 
and Kimmel include the highest degree completed by the respondent's parents, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent lived with her parents by age 18 and the respondent's 
years of schooling in the first stage. The coefficient on the motherhood variable is reduced by 
more than 40 percent after non-working women are included in the analysis. Their result 
suggests that the child penalty is overstated due to selection bias. I use the same approach but 
include a different set of control variables in the first stage. The control variables I include are 
the respondent's general health condition, a dummy indicator of presence of toddlers, total 
transfer from a government program, and a dummy indicator of presence of a spouse/partner 
with positive income. I find that the presence of toddlers is a stronger predictor of a woman's 
employment choice. 
My work is also related to recent studies that take a quantitative approach to study the 
interactions between fertility decisions and labor market outcomes. Erosa et al. (2002) build and 
calibrate a model of fertility and labor market choices to study the cause of gender difference in 
employment and wages. They find that fertility decisions generate a long-lasting employment 
ratio difference and wage gap between males and females. Da-Rocha and Fuster (2005) develop 
a two-stage theoretical model to explain the positive association between fertility rates and 
female employment among OECD countries. The calibrated model implies that labor market 
frictions lead women to postpone child birth, which explains why countries with lower female 
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employment ratio also have lower fertility rates. Other theoretical work on women's labor 
market outcomes focus more on marriage issues rather than fertility decisions.33
My research contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I develop a simple 
theoretical model that offers a framework to examine fertility and labor market decisions. The 
implications of the model are consistent with the empirical results. Second, I focus on a young 
cohort aged 24 to 30 in 2009 using more recent data (2004-2009) from the 1997 National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY97). I compare my results with studies based on other 
U.S. data sets (i.e. NLSY79 and NLSYW) and examine the trend in the child wage penalty over 
time. Third, in addition to cross-sectional OLS and the fixed effects model, I adopt the two-
stage Heckman selection model to correct for selection bias. The empirical results verify the 
existence of selection bias and show that the child penalty is overestimated due to this bias. 
 Compared to 
previous work, my model is relatively simple and focuses on a different set of questions. In my 
model, women make employment and fertility decisions simultaneously and their choice of 
working depends on their labor market prospects as well as motherhood status. I show that the 
reservation wage is different for mothers and non-mothers. This finding indicates the 
importance of accounting for non-working women in the analysis on the child penalty.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the model with its predictions. 
Section 3 introduces econometric approaches and reports the empirical results. Section 4 
concludes. 
 2 The Model 
 2.1 A model of fertility and labor supply 
Consider a model where women choose time allocation among work, child care and 
leisure. Time spent on work, children and leisure can be denoted by 𝑡𝑤, 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑙, respectively. If 
a woman chooses not to work, 𝑡𝑤 = 0. If a woman chooses not to have children, 𝑡𝑐 = 0. A 
positive 𝑡𝑐 denotes the total time a woman spends with children. I don't model the number of 
children in this study, so 𝑡𝑐 can be distributed across more than one child. Women gain utility 
from consumption, time spent with children and leisure. Women gain utility from consumption, 
                                                 
33 See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Caucutt et al. (2002) and Chade and Ventura (2002). 
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time spent with children and leisure. The utility function is concave in these three inputs as 
shown below 
𝑈 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑤(ℎ, 𝑒,𝑑)𝑡𝑤 + 𝑛) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑐 + 𝜌) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑙) 
where w is the wage rate which is a function of human capital, h, which can be gained from 
education and experience; labor market environment, e, i.e. the wage premium of certain 
occupations and contracts (part-time versus full-time) and demographic variables, d. Term 
𝑤(ℎ, 𝑒, 𝑑)𝑡𝑤 is labor income. Consumption has a second part, n ≥ 0, which is non-labor income, 
i.e. transfer payment from government, spouse or parents. Term ρ > 0 denotes women's 
preference for motherhood. This motherhood preference is affected by marital status, family 
background and environment. A lower ρ indicates more interest in having and raising children. 
Consider the extreme case when ρ → 0, the marginal utility of having children is close to 
infinite when 𝑡𝑐 = 0, so a woman chooses to be a mother. I define 𝑇 = (𝑡𝑐, 𝑡𝑤, 𝑡𝑙) and let the 
time endowment to be 1. Women choose T to solve the following problem max
𝑇
𝑙𝑛(𝑤(ℎ, 𝑒,𝑑)𝑡𝑤 + 𝑛) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑐 + 𝜌) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑙) 
subject to 
𝑡𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑡𝑙 ≤ 1 
𝑡𝑐, 𝑡𝑤 ≥ 0, 𝑡𝑙 > 0. 
Rewrite the woman's problem as the following Lagrangian max
𝑇
𝐿 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑤(ℎ, 𝑒,𝑑)𝑡𝑤 + 𝑛) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑐 + 𝜌) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑙) + 𝜆(1 − 𝑡𝑤 − 𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡𝑙). 
The time constraint always binds, λ > 0, since utility is increasing in all time input. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are tw: wwtw + n  − λ ≤ 0, tw ≥ 0, and � wwtw + n  − λ� tw = 0 (3.1) tc: 1tc + ρ  − λ ≤ 0, tc ≥ 0, and � 1tc + ρ  − λ� tc = 0 (3.2) tl: 1tl  = λ and tl > 0 (3.3) 
λ: 1 − tw − tc − tl = 0. (3.4) 
The model can be solved analytically and there are four cases regarding women's choice 
of 𝑡𝑤 and 𝑡𝑐.  I adopt superscript ∗ to indicate a positive value. For example, solution 𝑇 =(𝑡𝑤∗ , 0, 𝑡𝑙∗) shows a woman's choice of positive work time, zero time investment in children and 
positive leisure time. This solution suggests that a woman is working, but chooses not to have 
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children. Since 𝑡𝑙 ∈ (0, 1], so I remove term 𝑡𝑙∗ in all cases with the understanding that leisure 
time is positive. The four cases are listed below and they are linked to observed employment 
and motherhood status 
• Case 1: working childless women. Let 𝑇 = (𝑡𝑤∗ , 0), equations (3.1) and (3.3) into 
equation (3.4) and the assumption 𝑡𝑐 = 0 give 
𝑡𝑤 = 𝑡𝑤∗ = 𝑤 − 𝑛2𝑤 ; 𝑡𝑐∗ = 0; 𝑡𝑙 = 𝑡𝑙∗ = 𝑤 + 𝑛2𝑤 ; 
• Case 2: working mothers. Let 𝑇 = (𝑡𝑤∗ , 𝑡𝑐∗), equations (3.1)-(3.3) into equation (3.4) 
gives 
𝑡𝑤 = 𝑡𝑤∗ = − 2𝑛3𝑤 + 1 + 𝜌3 ; 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑡𝑐∗ = 𝑛3𝑤 + 1 − 2𝜌3 ; 𝑡𝑙 = 𝑡𝑙∗ = 𝑛3𝑤 + 1 + 𝜌3 ; 
• Case 3: Non-working mothers. Let 𝑇 = (0, 𝑡𝑐∗), equations (3.2) and (3.3) into 
equation (3.4) and the assumption 𝑡𝑤 = 0 give 
𝑡𝑤 = 0; 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑡𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝜌2 ; 𝑡𝑙 = 𝑡𝑙∗ = 1 + 𝜌2 ; 
• Case 4: Non-working childless women. Let 𝑇₄ = (0, 0), equation (3.3) into equation 
(3.4) and the assumption 𝑡𝑤 = 𝑡𝑐 = 0 give 
𝑡𝑤 = 0; 𝑡𝑐 = 0; 𝑡𝑙∗ = 1. 
 2.2 Some predictions 
 The model yields the following results. 
 Proposition 1: 𝜌 ≤ (1/2) is a sufficient condition for the choice of being a mother, 
𝑡𝑐
∗ > 0; 𝜌 ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition for the choice of being childless, 𝑡𝑐∗ = 0; When 𝜌 ∈(1
2
, 1), a woman chooses to be a mother, only if  the wage is low enough, 𝑤 ≤ 𝑛
2𝜌−1
. 
Proof: consider conditions for case 2: 𝑡𝑤 = 𝑡𝑤∗ = − 2𝑛3𝑤 + 1+𝜌3 ≥ 0 and 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑡𝑐∗ = 𝑛3𝑤 +
1−2𝜌
3
≥ 0. Using 𝜌 > 0, these constraints can be written as 
𝑤 ∈ [ 2𝑛
𝜌 + 1 , 𝑛2𝜌 − 1] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 ∈ (12 , 1];  (3.5) 
𝑜𝑟 𝑤 ≥ 2𝑛
𝜌 + 1  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 ∈ (0, 12]. 
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Next consider conditions for case 3: 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑡𝑐∗ = 1−𝜌2 ≥ 0 and 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑤+𝑛 − 𝜆 ≤ 0 when 
𝑡𝑤 = 0. Combine 𝜆 = 1𝑡𝑙∗ = 11+𝜌2   into these constraints 
𝑤 ≤
2𝑛
𝜌 + 1  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 ≤ 1;  (3.6) 
Combining equations (3.5) and (3.6) gives the conditions for the choice of having 
children, 𝑡𝑐 > 0. Given any wage rate, w, women with 𝜌 ≤ 12 always choose to be a mother. 
Consider conditions for case 1: 𝑡𝑤∗ = 𝑤−𝑛2𝑤 ≥ 0 and 1𝑡𝑐+𝜌 − 𝜆 ≤ 0 when 𝑡𝑐 = 0. Using 
𝜆 = 1
𝑡𝑙
∗ = 1𝑤+𝑛
2𝑤
, I derive 
𝑤 ≥ max �𝑛, 𝑛2𝜌 − 1� 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 ≥ 12 (3.7) 
Next consider conditions for case 4: 𝑤
𝑤𝑡𝑤+𝑛
− 𝜆 ≤ 0 when 𝑡𝑤 = 0 and 1𝑡𝑐+𝜌 − 𝜆 ≤ 0 
when 𝑡𝑐 = 0. Given 𝜆 = 1𝑡𝑙∗ = 1, these constraints can be combined into 
𝑤 ≤ 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 ≥ 1 (3.8) 
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) give the conditions for the choice of having no children, 
𝑡𝑐
∗ = 0. Given any wage rate, w, women with 𝜌 ≥ 1 always choose to have no children. 
Equations (3.5) and (3.7) show that wage is relevant to a woman's fertility decision when 
ρ falls in the middle range. When 𝜌 ∈ (1
2
, 1), if 𝑤 ≤  𝑛
2𝜌−1
, a woman chooses have no children. 
Otherwise, she chooses to be childless. ■ 
Proposition 1 indicates the importance of women's preference for motherhood on their 
fertility choice. With a high enough ρ (the lower bound is 1), women choose to have no children 
regardless of their potential wage. While when ρ is low enough (the higher bound is 1/2), 
women with all possible wages choose to be a mother. The wage rate is relevant to women's 
fertility choice only when ρ is in a middle range, i.e. 𝜌 ∈ (1
2
, 1). 
Proposition 2: A mother chooses to work only if 𝑤 > 2𝑛
𝜌+1
.  A childless woman chooses 
to work only if 𝑤 >  𝑛. 
Proof: equations (3.7) and (3.8) suggest that for a woman who chooses not to have 
children, if the wage exceeds n, she chooses to work. Otherwise, she chooses not to work. 
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Equations (3.5) and (3.6) together show that for a woman who chooses to have children, if the 
wage exceeds 2𝑛
𝜌+1
, she chooses to work. Otherwise she stays outside of the labor market. 
Proposition 2 shows the reservation wage of mothers and non-mothers. Reservation 
wage here means the wage rate at which a woman is indifferent between working and not 
working. The reservation wage is 2𝑛
𝜌+1
 and n for mothers and childless women, respectively. 
When 𝜌 < 1, a mother faces a higher reservation than a non-mother, and vice versa. ■ 
Notice that given the same n, all childless women face the same reservation wage, while 
the mothers' reservation wage varies with the preference term, ρ. Mothers with stronger 
preference for child care face a higher opportunity cost of working, and thus their wage needs to 
exceed a higher threshold in order for them to work. For this reason, it is possible that a non-
working mother has a higher potential wage than a working mother but still chooses not to 
work, because she prefers child care more. In contrast, a non-working childless woman always 
has a lower potential wage than a working childless woman.  
Figure 3-1 helps to explain this finding. Each of the four areas in the graph represents 
the combinations of wage, w, and preference parameter, ρ, that correspond to women's 
employment and motherhood choice (i.e. A-working non-mothers; B-non-working non-
mothers; C-working mothers; D-non-working mothers). For example, area A shows that when 
both wage and preference parameter are large enough, a woman chooses to work but have no 
children. Compare area A and B which corresponds to working and non-working childless 
women, respectively. Any point in A is above B, which means non-working childless women 
all face a lower potential wage than working childless woman. The same is not true for area C 
and D which corresponds to working and non-working mothers, respectively. There are points 
in D that are above some points in C. It suggests that some non-working mothers may face a 
higher potential wage than some working mothers, but they choose not to work due to a low 
value of ρ. This finding is supported by the empirical results. I show that the mean potential 
wage of non-working mothers is not significantly different than the mean wage of working 
mothers, while non-working childless women would have earned much less than their working 
counterparts. 
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In estimating the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers, excluding all non-
working women is equivalent to removing both area B and D out of the picture. This may cause 
selection bias, because some potential high wage earners among mothers are excluded while 
only low wage earners among childless women are excluded. Consequently, the wage gap 
between mothers and non-mothers is overestimated. To correct for the bias, I include non-
working women in the empirical analysis and show that the wage gap is overstated due to the 
existence of selection bias. 
 3 Empirical Analysis 
 3.1 Methodology 
I use a panel sample of young women aged 24 to 30 in 2009 in the empirical analysis. 
The panel dataset enables me to control for unobserved worker characteristics, such as work 
ethics and ambition. If women with children are more devoted to home production and less 
focused on work than women without children, the cross-sectional estimates tend to overstate 
the children effect. I compare estimates in cross-sectional and panel analysis to examine the 
impact of individual heterogeneity on the child penalty. 
The wage equation estimated is as follows 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (3.9) 
Figure 3-1. Women’s fertility and employment choice 
     2n 
A 
B 
C 
   D 
ρ 
 
1/2 1 
n 
w 
69 
 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is self-reported hourly monetary compensation in 2009 dollars of respondent i's 
primary job in year t for all i=1,2,...1240 and t=2004,2005,...2009. 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is a set of motherhood 
variables for respondent i in year t. In the first specification, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating 
the presence of children. In the second specification, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 are dummy variables indicating the 
number of children, i.e. zero, one, or two or more. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of productivity and 
demographic variables of respondent i in year t. Specifically, I control the highest degree, 
AFQT scores, work experience, tenure, age, race, part time, marital status, occupation and urban 
residence. Term 𝑣𝑖 is the unobserved individual-specific effect, which is invariant over time; 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the standard error term. The estimate of interest is β. Having wages in the natural log 
form as the dependent variable, I interpret β as the impact of motherhood variables on wage 
expressed on a percentage basis. 
If unobserved worker attributes are correlated with control variables, random effect 
estimators provide inconsistent estimates. Since individual characteristics that are correlated 
with wages are usually related with education choices, i.e. perseverance and self-discipline, I 
use a fixed effects estimator. 
Wages are only available for employed women. Therefore, the wage regression incurs a 
sample selection bias. If there is systematic difference between the reservation wage of mothers 
and that of non-mothers, the child penalty can be overstated or understated due to the exclusion 
of non-working population. To address the problem, I use the Heckman two-stage method. In 
the first stage, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of working and obtain the inverse 
Mill’s ratio (λ). In this regression, I not only include all the productivity and demographic 
variables in 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 in equation (3.9), I also control the respondent's general health condition, a 
dummy indicator of presence of children under the age of 3, total amount of money received 
from a government program excluding unemployment insurance and worker's compensation, 
and a dummy indicator of presence of a spouse/partner with positive income during the last 
period. In the second stage, I add the inverse Mill's ratio (λ) as an explanatory variable in the 
wage regression (3.9). 
 3.2 Data 
The panel data used in this study is from the 1997 National Longitudinal Surveys of 
Youth (NLSY97). These surveys cover a nationally representative youth sample of 6,748 
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individuals aged 12 to 18 as of December 31, 1996. The first round survey was conducted in 
1997, and the follow up surveys took place on a yearly basis. The NLSY97 was designed to 
document youths' transition from schools to work and to adulthood. It contains extensive 
information on respondents' demographic characteristics, schooling experiences, family 
background, employment and fertility. I work with an unbalanced panel dataset on women from 
the 2004-2009 surveys. In my empirical analysis, I restrict my sample to observations for which 
information is available regarding demographics, education, fertility, employment and marriage 
across years. Since the purpose of this study is to examine the labor outcomes of women in 
early career, I exclude all the women who were enrolled in school during 2004-2009 survey 
years. After the restrictions above, I have 1,460 women (1,240 working women and 220 non-
working women) in the 2009 survey and 4,027 women in the five-year panel. 
The wage included in this study is hourly monetary compensation of respondents’ 
primary jobs in 2009 dollars. I exclude the sample with extreme reports (hourly wage being 
lower than 5 dollars or higher than 200 dollars). I measure work experience by the number of 
working weeks accumulated through years. Tenure is a variable indicating the number of weeks 
of total tenure at the primary job to the survey date. Other than the highest degree received, I 
also include the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores to control for women's 
academic achievement. The Armed Forces Qualification Test is used by the U.S. armed forces 
as a measure of ability. The raw AFQT scores are problematic when used for comparison across 
ages. To correct for that problem, the NLSY97 reports revised AFQT scores adjusted for age. 
Table 3-1 presents statistics summary of the sample of working women in the 2009 
survey. The first column shows statistics of all working women, and the second and third 
columns report descriptive information for working mothers and non-mothers, respectively. The 
1,240 working women aged from 24 to 30 in 2009 indicating that most of them were at the early 
stage of their career. On average, they earn approximately 17 dollars per hour. Regarding 
education, 6 percent of the sample has no degree and 24 percent of them have only a high 
school diploma or a GED. 37 percent of the sample graduated from college. The rest received 
either a master or Ph.D. degree. In my sample, 47 percent of the women are mothers and around 
half of the mothers have two or more children. 
Comparing the second and third columns in Table 3-1, a few differences are worthy of 
note. Women without children, on average, receive higher education and AFQT scores, obtain 
more work experience and are more likely to work full-time than mothers. The wage gap 
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between mothers and childless women is prominent in the descriptive evidence. It is suggested 
that mothers earn 23 percent less than childless women per hour. 
Table 3-1. Variables, means and standard deviation in the year, 2009 
           (Standard Deviation for Continuous variables in Parentheses) Variable All working women Mothers Non-mothers 
Wage (2009 $) 17.24 (11.9) 14.93 (10.39) 19.32 (12.89) 
Mother 0.47 1 0 
One child 0.22 0.46 0 
Two or more children 0.25 0.54 0 
Age 26.26 (1.47) 26.47 (1.45) 26.07 (1.46) 
Black 0.17 0.22 0.12 
White 0.72 0.57 0.77 
Other race 0.11 0.21 0.11 
Married 0.37 0.47 0.27 
Less than high school 0.06. 0.11 0.01 
High school 0.24 0.34 0.14 
Some college 0.26 0.31 0.23 
College 0.37 0.22 0.50 
Graduate school 0.07 0.02 0.12 
AFQT score 52.67 (28.36) 42.86 (26.69) 61.50 (26.91) 
Work experience in 
 
382.06 (140.07) 371.13 (143.86) 391.88 (135.93) 
Tenure in weeks 138.90 (123.56) 138.19 (126.94) 139.54 (120.54) 
Part-time 0.31 0.37 0.25 
Urban 0.79 0.75 0.83 
Professional and 
 
0.17 0.11 0.24 
Sales 0.12 0.15 0.09 
Clerical 0.31 0.37 0.27 
Laborers 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Services 0.25 0.22 0.28 
Operatives (workers) 0.21 0.25 0.16 
Number of 
 
1240 587 653 
 
I include non-working women in the analysis to control for selection bias. Table 3-2 
shows statistics of working women and non-working women and offers a comparison on 
productivity indicators. Note that non-working women are disproportionately black, married 
and mothers of two or more children than working women. In terms of educational background, 
working women tend to receive higher degrees and higher AFQT scores than women who are 
not in the labor market. The comparison between the first and second columns reflects that non-
working women are less competitive wage earners than working women. 
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Table 3-2. Working women and non-working women, 2009 
        (Standard Deviation for Continuous variables in Parentheses) 
Variable All working women Non-working women 
Mother 0.47 0.83 
One child 0.22 0.22 
Two or more children 0.25 0.61 
Black 0.17 0.22 
White 0.72 0.67 
Other race 0.11 0.11 
Married 0.37 0.50 
Less than high school 0.06 0.22 
High school 0.24 0.32 
Some college 0.26 0.30 
College 0.37 0.15 
Graduate school 0.07 0.01 
AFQT score 52.67 (28.36) 37.31 (27.89) 
Work experience in weeks 382.06 (140.07) 218.28 (152.51) 
Number of observations 1,240 220 
 3.3 Results 
 3.3.1 Baseline estimates 
Table 3-3 shows the estimation results of pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
using the sample from 2004-2009 surveys. In specification (1), I only control for basic 
demographic variables (i.e. age, race, marital status and urban residence) and leave out 
productivity variables. Data column (1) shows the results. Mothers earn approximately 16 
percent less than childless women per hour. After controlling for education and ability with the 
highest degree completed and AFQT scores in specification (2), the wage gap is substantially 
reduced to 5.4 percent. This indicates that the observed wage gap between mothers and women 
without children can be mostly explained by the disparity in education and ability. Including 
work experience and quadratic work experience in the regression, I move on to specification (3) 
and find that the child penalty falls by another 1.8 percentage points. Column (4) reports the 
estimate of the child penalty after tenure and quadratic tenure are controlled. The result implies 
that mothers still bear a wage penalty of 3.2 percent. As shown in column (5), controlling for 
occupation does not have a large impact on the wage penalty. 
I switch to the other set of motherhood variables indicative of the presence of one or 
more children in the next specification. Column (6) in Table 3-3 shows the results. After 
controlling for all productivity and demographic variables, there is wage penalty of 3.2 percent 
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for both having one child and having two or more children. However, the result for mothers 
with one child is not statistically significant. 
Table 3-3. Pooled OLS estimation results of wage equations, NLSY97, 2004-2009 
 Variables Log hourly monetary compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mother -0.159*** -0.054*** -0.036** -0.032** -0.032**  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
One child      -0.032 
      (0.021) 
Two or more 
 
     -0.032* 
      (0.016) 
Highest degree  × × × × × 
AFQT score  × × × × × 
Work experience   × × × × 
Tenure    × × × 
Occupation     × × 
Observations 4,027 4,027 4,027 4,027 4,027 4,027 
R-squared 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.25 
1. × means the variables are included in the regression. 2. Age, age squared, ethnicity, urban, part-time and marital 
status are controlled in all specifications. 3. Standard error in parentheses; * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% 
    *** significant at 1%. 
Compared to the estimates in other studies on U.S. data, with the same method and 
control variables, I derive smaller wage effects.34 It is largely due to the younger age of my 
sample.35
 3.3.2 Correcting for heterogeneity and selection bias 
 The comparison suggests that the wage gap is widened over years. There are several 
explanations for this trend. First, human capital may grow faster with more experience for 
childless women than for mothers. Thus, part of the motherhood penalty appears with time and 
should not affect my younger sample. Second, from the signaling theory's perspective, having 
no children at an older age is a stronger signal of commitment and concentration to work to 
employers and the stronger signal results in a higher wage premium. 
                                                 
34 Anderson et al. (2003) use NLSYW68-88 data and show that the wage effect of one child is 5.6% and that of two 
or more children is 8.2%. Kimmel et al (2005) use 19 rounds of NLSY79 surveys and their estimated one child 
effect is 4.5% and two or more children effect is 8.9%. 
35 The average age of my sample is 26 at the last survey. Kimmel et al (2005) studies a group of women with a 
mean age of 40. In Anderson et al (2003), women aged from 34 to 44 in the year when last survey took place. 
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To control for individual characteristics that may explain the wage penalty, I estimate 
the wage gap in the fixed effects model. I then address the selection problem by including non-
working women and using a two-stage Heckman selection model. Table 3-4 shows the results. 
I report the results from the pooled OLS again in the first and second columns of Table 
3-4 for the ease of comparison. As shown in column (3) of Table 3-4, the child penalty becomes 
1.5 percentage points larger but less significant after accounting for heterogeneity. The 
following column shows in the fixed effects model that having one child results in a wage 
penalty of 5.7 percent, while having two or more children does not significantly affect women's 
wages. With the larger estimates in the fixed effects model, I conclude that individual effects 
don't contribute to the child penalty. This finding is consistent with Waldfogel (1998)'s results. 
Including non-working women increases the sample size by around 25 percent. The final 
two columns in Table 3-4 present the results from the Heckman selection model. In each of the 
two specifications, the estimates of children effects are small and statistically insignificant after 
correcting for selection bias. This result implies that excluding non-working women causes an 
upward bias on the estimated child wage penalty. 
Table 3-4. Estimation results in the fixed effects model and Heckman selection model 
             Variables  Log hourly monetary compensation 
 Pooled 
 
 Fixed 
 
 
 Heckman 
 
 
 
Mother -0.032**  -0.047*  -0.004  
 (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.018)  
One child  -0.032  -0.057**  0.003 
  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.025) 
Two children  
 
 -0.032*  -0.036  -0.007 
  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.019) 
Observations 4027 4027 4027 4027 4027 4027 
1. Race and AFQT scores drop out in the fixed effects model. Productivity and demographic variables all have the 
expected signs in both fixed effects model and Heckman selection model. 2. Standard error in parentheses; 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. 
Using the estimates of the wage equation from the Heckman selection model, I calculate 
the estimated mean wage of women by fertility and working status. Table 3-5 shows the 
statistics. I interpret the wage of non-working women as the wage they would have earned if 
they chose to work. First compare the mean wages across rows. It is shown that among working 
women, mothers earn lower wages than non-mothers. The estimated wage differential is $1.22. 
The same pattern exists among non-working women. Mothers, on average, would have earned 
lower wages than non-mothers if both groups chose to work. However, the wage gap is as small 
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as $0.49. This explains why the estimated motherhood wage penalty becomes smaller and 
insignificant when non-working women are included. 
Table 3-5. Estimated mean wage from the Heckman selection model 
 (Standard Deviation in Parentheses) 
 Working Non-working 
Mothers 13.713 (0.057) 13.282 (0.082) 
Non-mothers 14.933 (0.073) 13.771 (0.160) 
 
Comparing the mean wages across columns, I find that working women, on average, 
earn a higher wage than non-working women. However, the wage gap is much larger among 
non-mothers than that among mothers. This finding can be explained by Proposition 2 of the 
model that mothers face various reservation wages. Mothers who select out of the labor market 
may have relatively high wages, but since they have strong preference for child care, they 
choose not to work. This explains the small wage gap between working mothers and non-
working mothers. On the contrary, all non-mothers face the same reservation wage. If a 
childless woman chooses not to work, that is only because her wage is too low. This is why 
there is a large wage gap between working and non-working childless women. 
 3.3.3 Estimating the likelihood of working 
In the first stage of the Heckman selection model, I estimate the likelihood of working 
with all the control variables in the wage regression and an additional set of variables. The 
additional variables include the respondent's general health condition and presence of toddlers. 
Table 3-6 reports the estimates of interest in the probit model. 
The first data column in Table 3-6 shows the estimates in specification (1), in which 
motherhood variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent has children. In 
specification (2), motherhood variables are dummies indicating the number of children (the 
choices are 0, 1, and 2 or more). The estimates in specification (2) are shown in the second 
column in Table 3-6. 
The motherhood variables are all negative and significant in each of the specifications 
suggesting that mothers are less likely to work. The following row shows the impact of having 
toddlers at home on the likelihood of working. With the significantly negative estimates in both 
specifications, it is suggested that mothers with toddlers are less likely to work compared to 
childless women and other mothers. This result is not surprising, because children in early years 
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are physically vulnerable and they need care from adults, especially their own mothers for 
nursing. Mothers with toddlers have a higher opportunity cost of working. As a result, they have 
a lower probability of working even after controlling for labor market related variables. 
Table 3-6. Estimation results in the probit model for working decisions 
 Variables   Likelihood of working 
 (1) (2) 
Mother -0.115*  
 (0.062)  
One child  -0.141* 
  (0.077) 
Two or more children          -0.103 
  (0.066) 
Toddlers -0.153*** -0.151*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) 
Excellent health condition 0.156** 0.156** 
 (0.071) (0.071) 
Good health condition 0.240*** 0.239*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
Amount from a government 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Positive income of 
 
-0.040 -0.040 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 4958 4958 
1. Married women are less likely to work than single women; women with higher degrees and more experience are 
more likely to work. 2. Standard error in parentheses; * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
 1%. 
Self-reported health condition is also controlled in the probit model. The baseline 
dummy is poor health condition. As shown in Table 3-6, compared with women in poor health 
conditions, women in excellent and good health conditions are more likely to work. The 
estimates are at 1 percent level of significance. It indicates that health condition is a strong 
predictor of the likelihood of working. 
The model in Section 2 predicts that women with higher non-labor income face a higher 
reservation wage. To test for this prediction, I include total transfer from a government program 
in the probit model. The estimates in both specifications appear to have the expected sign. 
However, the results are not significant at 10 percent level. Since there is no variable in 
NLSY97 on direct transfer from parents or spouse, I control a dummy indicating whether the 
respondent's spouse/partner made positive income during the last period. The coefficient is 
negative as predicted but not statistically significant. 
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 4 Conclusion 
In the literature, the motherhood wage penalty is estimated using wage data on working 
mothers and non-mothers. Such analysis excludes non-working women and thus it potentially 
results in biased estimates due to sample selection. To include non-working women in the 
examination of the wage gap, I build a simple model of women's employment and fertility 
choices and derive the reservation wage of mothers and childless women. The model implies 
that all childless women with the same non-labor income face the same reservation wage, while 
mothers with different preference over motherhood face different reservation wages. Since the 
reservation wages of mothers and non-mothers have different forms, the wage gap observed in 
the labor market is a biased measure of the child wage effect. To empirically test for the 
existence of selection bias, I use data from the NLSY97 (2004-2009) and adopt the two-stage 
Heckman selection model. The women included in the analysis are aged 24 to 30 in 2009. The 
relatively young age of the sample enables me to focus on women's labor market outcomes in 
their early career. 
The estimates in the pooled OLS and the fixed effects model suggest a statistically 
significant wage penalty for mothers. More specifically, a mother's wage is 3.2 to 4.7 percent 
lower. This finding is consistent with the literature on the child wage penalty. However, the 
wage gap is eliminated in the Heckman selection model. This implies that selection bias does 
exist and it causes an overestimated child penalty. I calculate the potential wage of non-working 
women using estimates from the Heckman selection model. There is no statistically significant 
wage gap between non-working mothers and non-working childless women. This explains why 
the child penalty becomes smaller and insignificant when non-working women are included. 
The model presented in this paper provides insights on women's fertility and 
employment choices that are supported by the empirical results. However, women make work 
and fertility decisions simultaneously in my model while it is possible that these decisions are 
actually made sequentially. In addition, for simplicity, my analysis does not account for 
marriage decisions which may also have an impact on the labor market outcomes. I leave multi-
stage models and accounting for marriage decisions for future research. 
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 Appendix 1 
 Definition of equilibrium 
To facilitate the definition of an equilibrium in Chapter 1, we introduce more precise 
notation. With this notation, equation (1.5) is  
𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 = �𝛼𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝜂 �1𝜂 , 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 = �𝛼𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗𝜂 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗𝜂 �1𝜂 , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3}, (1.9) 
where 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 is the measure of human capital investment in early childhood in period t (third 
subscript) on behalf of the generation t (second subscript) member of dynasty i. This is a 
function of family spending, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡, and government spending 𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 on this agent in early 
childhood. Similarly, 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗, and 𝑔𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 are human capital investment, family spending, 
and government spending in late childhood on behalf of the same agent in period 𝑡 + 𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{1,2,3}. 
The aggregate of late childhood spending in equation (1.4) is  
𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙 = �𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+3�13 (1.10) 
and this combines with 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 to give a more precise statement of equation (1.3)  
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = �𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝛷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑟𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝛷 �1𝛷. (1.11) 
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This measure of education quality combines with the ability of the generation t member 
of dynasty i, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡, and the human capital of this agent's parents, ℎ𝑖,𝑡−4, to generate the human 
capital of this agent, ℎ𝑖,𝑡. Specifically  
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝜇 ℎ𝑖,𝑡−4𝜐 . (1.12) 
The generation 𝑡 − 4 member of dynasty i chooses family education spending on the 
generation t member of dynasty i in that member's early childhood and the three periods of late 
childhood. This is denoted by fi,t,t+j, j ∈ {0,1,2,3}. The agent also chooses own consumption in 
each of the 11 periods of adulthood, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, . . .10}, and bond holdings in each of 
these periods other than the last, 𝑏𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, . . .9}. These choices are made to maximize 
�𝛽𝑗
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗𝜎
𝜎
10
𝑗=0
+ 𝜉 ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜎
𝜎
 (1.13) 
subject to  
�
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗𝜎
𝑟𝑗
10
𝑗=0
+ �𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗
𝑟𝑗
3
𝑗=0
= ��𝑧
𝑟
�
𝑗
8
𝑗=0
𝑤ℎ𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜏)   (1.14) 
and the relationships in equations (1.9)-(1.12). There are non-negativity constraints on 
𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3} and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, . . .10}.  However, these do not bind in equilibrium 
and are therefore ignored. In the case of borrowing constraints, however we have the additional 
constraint  
𝑏𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡 ≥ 0. (1.15) 
Output in period t is 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝑤��ℎ𝑖,𝑡−4𝑁
𝑖=1
+ �𝑧ℎ𝑖,𝑡−5𝑁
𝑖=1
+ �𝑧2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−6𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ⋯+ �𝑧8ℎ𝑖,𝑡−12𝑁
𝑖=1
� = 𝑤𝐻𝑡 (1.16) 
and with 𝐺𝑡 being total government spending, the budget relationships are  
�𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝑁�𝑔𝑡−1,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡−2,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡−3,𝑡� = 𝜏𝑌𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡  (1.17) 
There are initially N dynasties in each of the 15 life cycle stages. The agents initially in 
early childhood are the first to have the full fifteen periods in the economy. Initial conditions 
must be specified for all other generations. For example, the original agents in the first period of 
late childhood must have an initial endowment of 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 and those originally in the second period 
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of late childhood must have endowments of 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡 and 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1. All adults in initial periods have 
equivalent endowments of human capital. Parents of the agents originally in early childhood 
make all the decisions described above. Other adults have an abbreviated set of choices to make. 
For example, parents of the agents in the first period of late childhood do not choose family 
spending on children in early childhood or consumption in their first period of adulthood. 
Empty nester and retiree choose only consumption in the remaining periods of their lives. For 
this reason, a different set of problems and constraints exist for initial agents. For brevity, these 
are not presented here and are ignored in the definition of an equilibrium.  However, they are 
straightforward to derive and are accounted for in programs which solve the model. 
An equilibrium is comprised of the sets of agents' choices and outcomes for {𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, . . .10}, 𝑏𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, . . .9},𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3},ℎ𝑖,𝑡} for all 𝑖 ∈{1,2. . .𝑁} and all 𝑡 ≥ 0, and government policy parameters {𝜏,𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡,𝑔𝑡−1,𝑡,𝑔𝑡−2,𝑡,𝑔𝑡−3,𝑡} for all 
𝑖 ∈ {1,2. . .𝑁} and all 𝑡 ≥ 0 such that 
1. Taking own human capital and government policy as given, the agent from dynasty i 
born in period 𝑡 − 4, 𝑡 ≥ 4 chooses 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ (0,1, . . .10),𝑏𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈(0,1, . . .9), and 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ (0,1,2,3)  to maximize equation (1.13) subject to equation 
(1.14) and in the case of borrowing constraints subject equation (1.15). 
2. The government sets taxes and expenditures to satisfy equations (1.16) and (1.17). 
3. Human capital accumulates as in equations (1.9)-(1.12). 
4. Surpluses and shortages in the goods market are accommodated by the international 
bond market. 
5. The labor market clears in each period. 
 Solving the model 
Since budget constraints will bind in equilibrium we define 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−4 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈{0,1, … 10} 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3}  and write the agent's problem as the following Lagrangian. 
𝐿 = max
𝑥𝑖,𝑡−4�𝛽𝑗 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗
𝜎
𝜎
10
𝑗=0
+ 𝜉 ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜎
𝜎
 
+𝜆 ���𝑧
𝑟
�
𝑗
8
𝑗=0
𝑤ℎ𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜏) −  �𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗𝜎 𝑟𝑗10
𝑗=0
−�
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𝑟𝑗
3
𝑗=0
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As mentioned above, there are reduced sets of choices for the 10 oldest original 
generations. First order conditions reduce to 
�
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗𝜎
𝑟𝑗
10
𝑗=0
= �(𝑧
𝑟
8
𝑗=0
)𝑗𝑤ℎ𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜏) −�𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗𝑟𝑗3
𝑗=0
 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡 = (𝑟𝛽)( 𝑗𝜎−1)𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2 … 10} 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡(𝜉 𝜕ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒𝜕𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡) 11−𝜎 
(1.18) 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗( 𝜉𝛽𝑗 𝜕ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙 𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝜕𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗𝜕𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑗) 11−𝜎, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2 … 10}  
In general, the model must be solved numerically. We generate an N×T matrix of errors 
drawn from a normal distribution with standard deviation 0.775 and mean 0. Here T is large and 
is the total number of time periods in which new agents enter the economy and N is the number 
of agents born in each period. We also create an N×3 matrix of original lagged values of 𝑎𝑖,𝑡. 
We use these matrices in equation (1.1) to generate an N×T matrix of 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 values. 
The first order conditions for agent i can be reduced to a system of four equations in 
𝑓𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3}. In order to choose family spending in each of these four periods, the 
agents must know government spending in each period of her offspring's childhood. In the 
initial period, the human capital and thus the income of all adults is known; i.e. specified as an 
initial condition. For a given tax rate then, total revenue collected is known and for a given 
distribution rule government spending on all students is known. The parents of the N children 
initially in the final stage of late childhood need only to choose family spending in this period; 
i.e.𝑓𝑖,0−7,0. Upon solving for spending for each agent, the income of their offspring in the 
subsequent period is determined since previous inputs to their human capital are specified as 
initial conditions. Since these will be the only entrants to the labor market in period 1, income 
of all workers in period 1 is known. From this we can find government spending on all agents in 
period 1. The parents of children initially in the second period of late childhood now have all 
information required to solve for their family spending in periods 0 and 1; i.e. 𝑓𝑖,0−6,0+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{0,1}. This will be sufficient to know income and thus government spending in period 2 as their 
offspring enter the labor force. Thus the parents of the agents initially in the first period of late 
childhood can solve for family spending in the three remaining periods of their offspring’s 
childhood; i.e. 𝑓𝑖,0−5,0+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2}. This will give income and thus government spending in 
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period 3, allowing the parents of agents initially in early childhood to solve for 𝑓𝑖,0−4,0+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{0,1,2,3} given their own human capital and the ability level of their offspring. 
Beyond this initial period, we only need to solve for the decisions of one generation in 
each period. For this generation we solve for their spending across four periods of financing 
education. Specifically, the parents of the agents in early childhood observe the productivity of 
their offspring and then choose 𝑓𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3}. They are able to do this because 
government spending on their offspring will depend only on the income of adults in the current 
and subsequent three periods. Since we know the family spending education of the preceding 
generations, we know the income of the current adults and those who will become adults over 
the next three periods while the current young are in school. With this we can find government 
spending in each period that they are in school. 
In this way, we calculate 𝑓𝑖,𝑡−4,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3} for all 𝑡 ∈ {0,1,2. . .𝑇} sequentially 
given our matrix of 𝑎𝑖𝑡 values. With this and government spending known, we can find other 
items such as consumption from equation (1.18). To eliminate the effects of our choice of 
starting values, we consider only the final T′ periods in our calculations. We choose T′ such that 
only periods where the economy is in a stochastic steady state are considered. In a stochastic 
steady state, the income of each generation varies through time as an endogenous response to 
the stochastic stream of abilities.  However the distribution of income is consistent through time 
and tends to stability as N and T′ become large. We use the generated data to compute income 
persistence and other items of interest. 
 Appendix 2 
I first provide more precise statements regarding human capital formation, agents' 
decision rule and government budget balance and then define a general equilibrium with full 
notations. The last part of this appendix describes the computation procedure. 
 Restating the model 
The measure of education expenditures in early and late childhood can be written as 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 = (𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒𝜂 + 𝑔𝑡,𝑒𝜂 )1𝜂,  𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙 = (𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝜂 + 𝑔𝑡,𝑙𝜂 )1𝜂    (2.11) 
where 𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 is the measure of education expenditures in early childhood (represented by e) on 
behalf of the generation t member (born in period t) of dynasty i. This is a function of private 
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spending, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 and government spending, 𝑔𝑡,𝑒. Since government spending is uniform across 
dynasties in each period, there is no subscript i in 𝑔𝑡,𝑒. This child transition into late childhood 
(represented by l) in the next period when the measure of education expenditures becomes 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙. This is again a function of private spending, 𝑓𝑖𝑡,𝑙 , and government spending, 𝑔𝑡,𝑙. 
With this more precise notation, equation (2.2) is 
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = �𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒𝛷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝛷 �1𝛷   (2.12) 
and this combines with this agent's innate ability, 𝑎𝑖, parental human capital, ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2, and parental 
time investment received in early childhood, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 to generate the human capital in equation (2.1) 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = ��𝑎𝑖𝑒𝑖,𝑡�𝜃 + �ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2𝑡𝑖,𝑡�𝜃�𝜈𝜃 .  (2.13) 
The generation t-2 member of dynasty i chooses time investment in children's early 
education, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡. With one unit of time endowment in each period, the agent's labor supply in 
early parenthood is 1− 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 accordingly. Give the wage function specified as below  𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗 = ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2𝑒𝛼𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ (1,2,3)  (2.14) 
where 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗 is the generation t-2 member of dynasty i's wage in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ period of adulthood 
and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗 is the agent's accumulated work experience at the beginning of that period, the life-
time income of the agent is 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1(1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,2 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,3. 
The generation t-2 member of dynasty i also chooses consumption in each period of 
adulthood, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{1, 2, 3} and family education spending early childhood, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 and family 
education spending in late childhood, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙. The choices are made to maximize 
�𝛽𝑗−1
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−𝑒,𝑗𝜎
𝜎
+ 𝜉 ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜎
𝜎
.3
𝑗=1
  (2.15) 
subject to 
∑
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗
𝑟𝑗−1
3
𝑗=1 + 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 + 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝑟 = �𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1�1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡� + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,2𝑟 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,3𝑟2 � (1 − 𝜏), (2.16) 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,1, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,2, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,3 ≥ 0,  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙 ≥ 0,  
𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0, 1].  
As mentioned earlier, there are 2N dynasties in the economy. In any given period t, N 
dynasties have agents in the first and third period of adulthood. Their total income is 
85 
 
∑ (𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1(1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−4,3)𝑁𝑖=1 . The other N dynasties have agents in the second period of 
adulthood and their total income ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−3,22𝑁𝑖=𝑁+1 . Therefore, output in period t is 
𝑌 = �(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1(1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−4,3)𝑁
𝑖=1
+ � 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−3,22𝑁
𝑖=𝑁+1
  (2.17) 
With 𝐺𝑡 being government expenditures, the budget relationship is 
𝑁𝑔𝑡,𝑒 + 𝑁𝑔𝑡,𝑙 = 𝜏𝑌𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡. (2.18) 
 Steady state equilibrium 
A steady state equilibrium is comprised of the sets of agents' allocational and 
educational outcomes {𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{1, 2, 3},𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2,ℎ𝑖,𝑡} for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2...2N} and 
all 𝑡 ≥ 0, and government policy parameters {𝜏,𝑔𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑔𝑡,𝑙} for all 𝑡 ≥ 0 such that 
1. Human capital formations satisfy equations (2.10)-(2.13). 
2. Taking own human capital, ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2, child's ability, 𝑎𝑖, and government policy as given, the 
generation t-2 member of dynasty i chooses 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 to 
maximize equation (2.15) subject to equation (2.16). 
3. The government sets taxes and expenditures to satisfy equations (2.17) and (2.18). 
4. Surpluses and shortages in the goods market are accommodated by the international 
bond market. 
5. The labor market clears in each period. 
6. ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2 = ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and similarly other generation specific variables are constant. 
 Solving the model 
I define 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3},𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and write the agent's problem as the 
following Lagrangian 
𝐿 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 �𝛽𝑗−1 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−𝑒,𝑗
𝜎
𝜎
+ 𝜉 ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜎
𝜎
3
𝑗=1
 
 +𝜆𝑖(�𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1�1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡� + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,2𝑟 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,3𝑟2 � (1 − 𝜏) − ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗𝑟𝑗−13𝑗=1 − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝑟 ). 
First-order conditions reduce to 
�
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗
𝑟𝑗−1
3
𝑗=1
= �𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1�1 − 𝑡𝑖,𝑡� + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,2𝑟 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,3𝑟2 � (1 − 𝜏) − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝑟  (2.19) 
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𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,1 = (𝑟𝛽) 𝑗𝜎−1𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {2,3} (2.20) 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,1(𝜉 𝜕ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑒𝜕𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒) 11−𝜎 (2.21) 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,1(𝑟𝜉 𝜕ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙 𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑙𝜕𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙) 11−𝜎 (2.22) 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,1 �𝜉 𝜕ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑖𝑖,𝑡 � 11−𝜎 (𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,1 − 𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,2𝜕𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2,3𝜕𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) 11−𝜎 (2.23) 
 
For the stationary equilibrium, I choose and update 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2 until 
convergence. More detailed steps are as follows 
1. Take initial guesses of 𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2. 
2. Given 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2, obtain 𝑔𝑡,𝑒 and 𝑔𝑡,𝑙 from the government budget relationship. 
3. Given 𝑎𝑖 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑒 ,𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑙, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑔𝑡,𝑒 and 𝑔𝑡,𝑙, obtain ℎ𝑖,𝑡 from human capital formation and 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3} from equations (2.19)-(2.20). 
4. Check the first-order conditions in equations (2.21)-(2.23) and convergence, ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =
ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2. If all equations hold, stop; otherwise update initial guesses and iterate from step 1 
until convergence. 
 
